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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Title of Dissertation:  Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage and Maritime Security   
in Archipelagic Southeast Asia 
 
 
Degree: Master of Science 
 
 
 This dissertation examines the regimes of archipelagic waters and archipelagic 
sea lanes passage in the context of the two primary proponents of the archipelagic 
principle in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in light of new 
developments in maritime security.  
 The assessment undertaken in this dissertation deals with the unprecedented 
efforts of the Philippines and Indonesia to persuade the international community to 
recognize the archipelagic concept, that a group of islands and the waters around, 
between and connecting the islands belong to one state should be treated as one single 
entity for the purpose of delimiting the maritime zone to achieve prosperity and 
development free from external pressure. In order to uphold the traditional freedom of 
navigation of the international community in seeming opposition to the concept, the 
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage through archipelagic waters was granted to 
foreign vessels. This concession was given for purposes of reconciling the conflicting 
interests in a manner acceptable to all concerned.  
 Chapter IV highlights the experience of Indonesia, as the first archipelagic state 
to designate archipelagic sea lanes passage while Chapter V looks at the concerns of the 
Philippines with regard to the issue of designating such sea lanes.  
The concluding chapters contain an analysis of the factors influencing the 
designation and the exercise of the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage, and an 
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assessment of whether the compromise results in a balance. Relevant recommendations 
are made with regard to Indonesia and the Philippines. 
 
KEYWORDS: Archipelago, Archipelagic States, Archipelagic Waters, 
Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage, UNCLOS  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 One of the oldest and most recognized principles governing ocean space is 
freedom of the sea enshrined in the chapter ‘De Mare Liberum’ of Hugo Grotius’s ‘De 
Iure Praedae’.1 The principle upholds the free use of the sea for commercial purposes 
and at the same time rejects the claim of exclusive use and possible establishment of 
sovereignty over parts of the sea.2 It overshadowed national interests in coastal fisheries 
and most of the extravagant claims to maritime sovereignty were abandoned.3  
During post World War II period, Grotius’s approach to freedom of the seas 
began to be limited by claims of coastal states to sovereign rights over waters adjacent to 
their coast. 4  Claims to historic bays and archipelagic waters were among the few 
exceptional cases to this principle.5 The codification of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (UNCLOS 1982) gave way to expand the 
                                                            
 1 Rüdiger Wolfrum, Freedom of Navigation: New Challenges in Myron H. Nordquist, Tommy T.B. Koh 
and John Norton Moore (Editors), Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008 at p. 79 
 2 Karl Zemanek, Was Hugo Grotius Really in Favour of the Freedom of the Seas? Journal of the History 
of International Law  Vol.1 No.1 1999  at pp. 48-60   
 3 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd Edition, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1999 at p. 204  
 4 Agustin Blanco-Bazan, Freedom of Navigation: An Outdated Concept? Background concepts to the 
lecture delivered by Dr. Agustín Blanco-Bazán at the IFLOS Summer Academy on 17 August 2007 
http://www.iflos.org 3 August 2010  
 5 Supra, footnote 3 at p. 205 
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law of the sea to recent developments concerning the interests of individual groups of 
states and the international community as a whole.6  
UNCLOS 1982 created a new regime for the sea-bed and the ocean floor and 
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; a special regime for 
archipelagic waters was introduced and increasingly recognized along with other ground 
breaking principles in international law.7 The regimes of archipelagic waters and mid- 
ocean archipelagos are perhaps some of the most difficult and complex problems in 
international law considering that geopolitics, economics and security interests as well 
as countless of attendant factors posed a monumental challenge.8  
The archipelagic states in Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Indonesia, pressed 
the international community for some time to recognize their right to establish a system 
of straight baselines around their archipelago.9 The geographical features of these two 
states can be described as landmasses connected by waters. Both states regard the waters 
landward of territorial sea as extensions of land territory. The seas around, between and 
connecting the landmasses need to be governed similarly to land territory. Their primary 
consideration for the recognition of the archipelagic principle is the preservation of the 
integrity of the archipelago.10 Another concern is directed at the presence in their waters 
of ships with special characteristics such as warships, surveillance vessels, unauthorized 
fishing vessels and vessels engaged in the carriage of contraband.11 For the reason that 
the Philippine and Indonesia lie in the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the 
geographical locations of these two major archipelagos constitute a barrier for maritime 
                                                            
 6 Budislav Vukas, Law of the Sea: Selected Writings, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2004 at p. 263 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wmulib 3 August 2010  
7 Ibid.  
8 Hiran W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International Law, AD Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1990 at p. 103 
 9 E. D. Brown, International Law of the Sea, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1994 at p. 20 
10 Supra, footnote 8 at p. 103 
11 Ibid., at p. 112 
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movement between the two great oceans.12 Also, most of the major straits in Southeast 
Asia pass through the waters of either of these two states.13  
Under the archipelagic regime, the traditional high seas freedom of navigation 
between islands of the archipelagic state has been replaced by a sui generis legal regime 
under archipelagic waters. 14  The establishment of baselines enclosing the entire 
archipelago would regard the waters in, between and around the islands and extending 
outward from the perimeter boundary line as forming part and parcel of the territory of 
these archipelagic states. 15  This very concept was opposed by the international 
community particularly by maritime powers that needed unrestricted freedom for their 
navies because of the crucial importance of free navigation of submarines to their 
interests.16 Their concerns stem from the fundamental concept of freedom of the sea 
derived from customary law. The high seas are free and open to the use of all nations 
and channels traditionally used for international shipping, where the right of free passage 
have been present and exercised long before, should be respected. 17  Further, this 
situation poses a threat to international navigation in the waters that would be enclosed 
by the straight baselines drawn around the outermost islands of archipelagos.18  
In view of the complexity of the problem, a major compromise was made in 
favour of inclusive interests, which permitted the right of passage through archipelagic 
waters.19 Two rights of passage were granted to third states within the archipelagic 
                                                            
12 Mark J. Valencia and James Barney Marsh, Access to Straits and Sea lanes in Southeast Asian Seas: 
Legal, Economic and Strategic Considerations, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 16 No. 4 
1985 at p. 513     
13 Barbara Kwiatkowska,  Archipelagic Regime in the Philippines and Indonesia, International Journal of 
Estuarine and Coastal Law, Vol. 6 No. 1 1991 at p. 30 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mnp/ijec/1991 7 July 2010  
14 Supra, footnote 13 at p. 2  
15 Supra, footnote 8 at p. 104 
16 Ibid., at pp. 112-113 
17Ibid., at p. 112 
18 Mohamed Munawar, Ocean States, Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of the Sea, AD Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995 at p. 10 
19 Supra, footnote 8 at p. 55 
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waters: the right of innocent passage and a newly defined right of archipelagic sea lanes 
passage.20 Innocent passage is for transit by ships through all other archipelagic waters 
except for internal waters of an archipelagic state; whereas archipelagic sea lanes 
passage is for transit by ships and aircraft in the designated sea lanes or through routes 
normally used for international navigation. 21  The right of innocent passage can be 
suspended whenever it is essential for the protection of the security of the archipelagic 
state 22 whereas, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage is a non-suspendable right. 23 
It reflects a level of freedom of passage by foreign shipping – with an arguably high seas 
character akin to those guaranteed under the regime of straits used for international 
navigation. 24  Passage under this regime is concerned with transit and carries no 
requirement of innocence.25 It also allows transit in ‘normal mode’, which includes 
submerged submarine transit, flight operations by aircraft carriers, and the undertaking 
of all usual shipboard activities and security measures.26 Johnson pointed out that this 
additional freedom is very significant to military vessels and aircrafts and considered as 
one of the principal concessions granted by archipelagic states to third states in the 
negotiation process.27 This compromise is intended to create a balance between the 
archipelagic states, with regard to their interests to exercise sovereignty over adjoining 
waters, and international community as the user states or third states on their desire to 
                                                            
20 Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers at p. 12 
21 Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 A 
Commentary, AD Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993 at p. 401 
22 Supra, footnote 20 at p. 12 
23 Constance Johnson, A Right of Passage: the IMO Consideration of the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea 
Lanes Submission, The International Journal Of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 15 No. 3 2000 at p. 319  
24 Timothy C. Perry, Blurring the Ocean Zones: The Effect of the Proliferation Security Initiative on the 
Customary International Law of the Sea, Ocean Development & International Law 2006, Vol. 37 No.1 at 
pp. 33-53 
25 Supra, footnote 23 at p. 318 
26 Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific Region, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs 
No.22 2008  at p.33 http://www.navy.gov.au/publication 25 July 2010 
27 Supra, footnote 23 
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retain historical freedom of the seas. Consequently, the specialized passage regime for 
archipelagic sea lanes was codified in Part IV Article 53 of UNCLOS 1982.  
Prescott states that “once a coastal state has declared archipelagic status it places 
upon itself considerable responsibilities to the international community, perhaps the 
greatest of which is the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage for international routes 
through the archipelago.”28 Presently, among the claimants of archipelagic status, it is 
only Indonesia that has designated archipelagic sea lanes. In 1996 Indonesia submitted a 
proposal to the International Maritime Organization (IMO)29 for the adoption of various 
sea lanes and air routes covering north-south routes through and over its archipelagic 
waters.30 The absence of other routes used for international navigation specifically the 
east-west route led to significant international protests from maritime states, including 
Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. 31  In this regard, the 
proposal was regarded only as partial designation and other archipelagic sea lanes will 
be required to satisfy the requirements of IMO.32 Also, it leaves the way open for user 
states to regard any route used for international navigation as available for archipelagic 
sea lanes passage.33  Although it was held by IMO as a partial designation, it was 
subsequently approved on May 1998 and duly entered into force through Indonesian 
Government Decree No. 37/2002 dated 22 June 2002.  
On the other hand, the Philippines has yet to submit a similar proposal to IMO 
although it has already identified the routes where archipelagic sea lanes will be 
designated. There are legal issues surrounding the case of the Philippines considering 
                                                            
28 Supra, footnote 20 at p. 12 
29 A specialized agency of the United Nations with main tasks of developing and maintaining a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping , safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, 
technical co-operation, maritime security and the efficiency of shipping. http://www.imo.org 10 July 2010 
30 Supra, footnote 23 at p. 317 
31 Supra, footnote 16 at p. 16   
32 Supra, footnote 20 at p. 13  
33 Supra, footnote 16 at p. 16 
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that it regards the archipelagic waters as internal waters.34 This implies that rights of 
innocent passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage may not be recognized in these 
waters. It has not also enacted legislation to govern routes used for international 
navigation. Be that as it may, its state practice complies with the requirements of 
UNCLOS 1982 in terms of allowing passage of foreign vessels through its archipelagic 
waters.35  
Under UNCLOS 1982, an archipelagic state is not required to designate 
archipelagic sea lanes. Should it choose to do so, however, it shall cover all routes used 
for international navigation. UNCLOS also provides that if no archipelagic sea lanes are 
designated, the right of passage may be exercised through routes normally used for 
international navigation. Given that the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage is non-
suspendable under any circumstances, different factors that may affect the designation or 
non-designation of these sea lanes, primarily the security of such sea lanes, their 
adjacent coasts and waters, and that of the state itself, will be the very focus of this 
study.  
 
1.1 Objective and Significance of the Study 
  
The events of September 11 changed the perception of the world to terrorism and 
increased the concern of all states with regard to their national security. This is 
illustrated by the notion that terrorists can turn ordinary means of transportation into 
devastating weapon against wide variety of targets, not only governmental but also 
economic lifelines.36 A large percentage of the global economy is facilitated through the 
                                                            
34 Supra, footnote 13 at p. 4 
35 Mary Ann Palma, The Philippine as an Archipelagic and Maritime Nation: Interests, Challenges and 
Perspective, RSIS Working Paper 2009 at p. 7 http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publication 25 June 2010  
36 Catherine Zara Raymond, Maritime Terrorism, A Risk Assessment: The Australian Example in Joshua 
Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond (Editors) The Best of Times, The Worst of Times, Nanyang: Institute of 
Defence and Strategic  Studies 2005 at p. 184 
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sea which makes shipping and seaborne trade attractive targets for terrorist attacks. This 
vulnerability is aggravated by difficulties of enforcement both in port and at sea and 
quantities of cargo involved which could be exploited by terrorist to launch an attack on 
shipping and port infrastructure that could cause massive economic disruption.37  
A significant volume of world trade, particularly those between East Asia and the 
rest of the world, passes through the important sea lanes and international routes of 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Any maritime threat that would result in the blocking of 
straits and international routes would affect the global economy and security of maritime 
domain of the archipelagic state. With this development, the maritime security concerns 
of these two archipelagos have increased further. For a long period of time, both states 
have been facing challenges regarding their respective strategic straits, sea lanes and 
other parts of the maritime domain. These challenges are brought about by the threats of 
piracy38, armed robbery against ships39 and maritime terrorism along with other crimes 
committed through the use of the sea. They also deal with the issue of intrusion of 
foreign vessels on their waters as a result of varying interpretation by third states of the 
status of archipelagic waters and sea lanes passage.  Taking into consideration these 
challenges, this dissertation sets the following objectives:   
 
1. Assess the importance of archipelagic sea lanes to the archipelagic states and 
the relevance of same to modern day maritime security concerns; 
                                                            
37 Sam Bateman, Assessing the Threat to Maritime Terrorism: Issues for Asia-Pacific Region, Security 
Challenges  Vol. 2 No. 3 2006 at p. 78 http://www.securitychallenges.org.au 12 July 2010  
38  Article 101 UNCLOS - (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed:(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such 
ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of 
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b). 
39 International Maritime Bureau definition -Armed Robbery Against Ship – any unlawful act of violence 
or detention or any act of depredation or threat thereof, other than act of piracy directed against a ship or 
against persons or property on board such ships, within a state’s jurisdiction over such offences.   
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2. Determine whether the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage affect 
territorial integrity of the archipelagic states; 
3. Evaluate whether the designation is necessary to have a systematic 
management of passage for foreign vessels through the archipelagic waters; 
4. Examine the so called balance of interests between archipelagic states and the 
user states relative to the designation of archipelagic sea lanes; 
5. Attempt to recommend measures relevant to the present status of the two 
biggest archipelagic states. 
 
1.2 Areas Covered and Research Method Applied 
 
 This study will trace the historical development of the archipelagic regime under 
UNCLOS 1982 in which the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage was introduced. In 
analyzing the rationale for Article 53 (Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage), it is 
necessary to look into state practices, experience of Indonesia in complying Article 53 
and the preliminary concerns of the Philippines in holding in abeyance the 
implementation of this Article, in the light of the new developments in maritime 
security. 
The research method applied in this study involves qualitative research in order 
to analyze the concept and entire framework of designation of archipelagic sea lanes and 
its impact on both the archipelagic states and the user states or third states. Literature 
reviewed in this regard included academic books, journal articles, thesis, conference 
papers and reports. Also utilized were articles taken from online libraries, relevant texts 
from internet websites and newspapers, concerning information that is not readily 
available in the WMU library. Interviews to the government officials of either the 
Philippines or Indonesia dealing with maritime security issues were not conducted due 
to lack of material time.  
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CHAPTER II   
 
ARCHIPELAGIC STATE REGIME 
 
 
 
2.1 Development under United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
 
The great efforts to draft a text on the special status for archipelagos started as 
early as the 1920s where the concept had been suggested in different international fora, 
such as the International Law Association, the Institute of International Law and the 
American Institute of International Law. It was also discussed at the Hague Codification 
Conference of 1930 but without conclusive results because technical information on the 
matter was inadequate. 40  The question of archipelagos particularly that of coastal 
archipelagos was taken up mostly in connection with the question of coastal baseline.41  
It was first raised in the Institute de Droit International and was discussed only 
in 1927 and 1928 where the following proposals were made by the Fifth Committee. 42 
 Where a group of islands belong to one coastal State and where 
the islands of the periphery of the group are not further apart 
from each other than the double breadth of the marginal sea, this 
group shall be considered a whole and the extent of the marginal 
sea shall be measured from a line drawn between the outermost 
parts of the island. 
 Where archipelagos are concerned, the extent of the marginal 
sea shall be measured from the outermost island or islets 
                                                            
40 Supra, footnote 21 at p. 399  
41 UN DOALOS Legislative History of Part IV UNCLOS, New York: United Nations 1990 at p. 1   
42 Supra, footnote 9 at p. 102 
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provided that the archipelago is composed of islands and islets 
not further apart from each other than twice the breadth of the 
marginal sea and also provided that the islands and islets nearest 
to the coast of the mainland are not situated further out than 
twice the breath of the marginal sea. 
While the question on archipelagos was also considered by the International Law 
Association (ILA), the proposal in this regard did not provide for the permissible 
distance between the islands of archipelagos but only states that “the islands thereof 
shall be considered as a whole and the extent of the territorial waters laid down in article 
4 shall be measured from the islands situated most distant from the centre of the 
archipelago”. 43  Similarly, the proposal of American Institute of International Law 
published in 1926 did not lay down the maximum distance but only provides that in case 
of archipelago, the islands and keys composing it shall be considered as forming a 
unit.44 The subject was also not dealt with in the Plenary of The Hague Codification 
Conference in 1930 although a proposed article thereof was drafted. 45 Seemingly, after a 
considerable debate on the issue of whether the rule that every island can generate a 
territorial sea should apply to a group of islands or whether there should be a special 
regime to govern it, the subject did not gain support among international bodies dealing 
with law of the sea.  
It was the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries case, 1951 ICJ Reports 116, 128 and 139 that gave rise to the discussion of a 
coastal archipelago concept. 46  It may be recalled that under this case, the United 
Kingdom challenged the legality of the lines of delimitation of  the Norwegian fisheries 
zone which was established based on the July 1935 Decree and was found by the Court 
                                                            
43 Ibid., at p. 103 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., at p. 104 
46 Supra, footnote 41 at p. 41 
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to coincide with the territorial sea of Norway. 47 The ICJ held that the method of straight 
baselines employed by Norway in connecting the outermost islands adjacent to its coast 
was not contrary to international law. 48 Taking into consideration the ICJ judgement, 
the International Law Commission included in its first draft several provisions allowing 
straight baselines to be used in case a state has fringe of islands in the immediate 
vicinity of its coast and it further analysed whether other types of archipelagos should 
fall under special regime or be treated similarly with isolated islands for purposes of 
delimitation of territorial waters. 49 However, the provisions on groups of islands were 
not included in the articles because of complexities brought by formations of different 
archipelagos where some were compact groups of islands with overlapping territorial 
seas while others were scattered and that there was no agreement on the breath of 
territorial sea. 50  It may be noted that the Anglo Norwegian Fisheries case judgment was 
the very first legal development and a concrete foundation to support the scheme but 
akin to previous proposals and submissions, the issue of archipelagos was left 
unresolved.  
Another attempt was made in the first United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS I) where Indonesia raised the issue of archipelagos with draft articles 
sponsored by Yugoslavia and the Philippines with the intention to apply the method of 
straight baselines to archipelagos. Under this principle, it was proposed to draw straight 
baselines around the outermost points of a coastal archipelago and connect them to the 
main island. 51 This is in effect applying by analogy the principle used by ICJ in the 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case to mid-ocean archipelagos like the Philippines and 
                                                            
47 Supra, footnote 9 at p. 24 
48 Supra, footnote 41  
49 Supra, footnote 21 at p. 400 
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Tonga. 52 However, the proposal was subsequently withdrawn for lack of international 
support. 53 Had the proposal been adopted, its application would enclose huge areas of 
water. 54  
In the second Law of the Sea Conference, the issue was raised again by the 
Philippines and Indonesia, pressing the claim for the special rules on the delimitation 
and status of archipelagic waters but the discussion did not reach any conclusion55. 
There was no major development on the issue of the archipelagic regime although the 
matter was continuously brought to the attention of the Conference.  
It was in 1971 that the subject matter was finally considered when the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction (Sea-bed Committee), particularly Sub Committee II, took note of the 
interests of the concerned states and the subject of archipelagos was placed as item 16 of 
its agenda. Attention was given to the special needs and interests of archipelagic states 
by setting out the principles which shall govern the regime of archipelagic waters 
including the provision of innocent passage through the designated sea lanes for 
international navigation through those waters. 56 Consequently, discussion of the issue 
began in 1973 where a group of four archipelagic states; the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Mauritius and Fiji submitted two proposals entitled “Archipelagic principles as proposed 
by the Delegations of Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines” concerning the 
general principles of archipelagic state and the draft articles on archipelagos57. The draft 
General Principles and Articles submitted by the proponent States contains the following 
provisions 58 
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54 Supra, footnote 9 at p. 106 
55 Supra, footnote 41 at p. 2 
56 Ibid., at p. 3 
57 Supra, footnote 21 at p. 401 
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General Principles 
 
 1. An archipelagic State, whose component islands and other natural 
features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity 
and historically have or may have been regarded as such, may draw 
straight baseline connecting the outermost points of the outermost 
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago from which the extent of 
the territorial sea of the archipelagic State is or may be determined. 
 
2. The waters within the baselines, regardless of their depth or 
distance from the coast, sea bed and the subsoil, and the superjacent 
air space, as well as their resources, belong to and are subject to the 
sovereignty of the archipelagic State. 
 
3. Innocent passage of foreign vessels through the waters of the 
archipelagic State shall be allowed in accordance with its national 
legislation, having regard to the existing rules of international law. 
Such passage shall be through sea lanes as may be designated for that 
purpose by the archipelagic State. 
 
Articles 
 
 2. An archipelagic State is a State constituted wholly or mainly by 
one or more archipelago. 
 
 3. For purposes of these articles an archipelago is a group of islands 
and other natural features which are so closely interralated that the 
component islands and other natural features form an intrinsic 
geographical, economic and political entity or which historically have 
been regarded as such. 
 
 
This proposal is considered as comprehensive and covers the whole range of 
archipelagic regimes, different from the proposals made during UNCLOS I, further 
giving a clear and concise picture of the general position of states claiming archipelagic 
status. 59 It also provides the drawing up of sstraight baselines connecting the outermost 
                                                            
59 Supra, footnote 18 at p. 91    
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points of the outermost islands for the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea and 
further establishing a regime in the regime inside the baseline which is considered as sui 
generis. 60 Relatively, the United Kingdom also submitted a proposal that sought to 
establish “objective criteria and to elaborate the legal status” of archipelagic states in 
order to determine which states composed of groups of islands would be eligible for 
application of the concept and to preclude other States with remotest archipelagic claim 
from using the archipelagic principles to expand their national domain by including vast 
ocean spaces. 61 The discussion in the Sea Bed Committee did not only recognize the 
pressing needs of the archipelagic states but it also provides a legal framework for the 
archipelagic regime. It may be noted that the issue is too complex as it involves the 
enclosure of waters previously used in international navigation to form part of the 
national territory of one State.  
 The enclosure of waters was the primary reason for the opposition from the 
major maritime states as it would overlap the important shipping routes and would result 
in the loss of navigational rights for both their naval and commercial vessels, 
particularly in the case of archipelagos like the Philippines and Indonesia. 62 
Notwithstanding, the issue on special archipelagic regimes was substantively discussed 
and pursued in Sub Committee II taking into account the special position of archipelagic 
states in international law and various criteria which would determine whether groups of 
islands would constitute archipelagos, as well as the nature of passage through 
archipelagic waters and straits. 63 During the Tenth Session of Sub Committee II in 1981, 
the concept of archipelago was laid down based on the proposed General Principles and 
Articles submitted by proponent states which eventually became part of  UNCLOS 
1982, where the status of enclosed waters and the rights of passage through archipelagic 
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waters were defined. 64 It may be easily understood that the intentions of these states are 
founded on the security and integrity of their respective territories. Considering the 
configuration of the states concerned, all the islands shall be unified and treated as one 
entity by drawing a straight baseline that would connect one island to another to prevent 
fragmentation.    
 
2.2 Concept of Archipelagic State under International Law 
 
  The concept of the new regime of archipelagos as laid down under Part IV of 
UNCLOS 1982 has the following essential features: first, it permits straight baselines to 
be drawn around the outermost islands of archipelagos; second, it creates a new legal 
concept of archipelagic waters designed to accommodate the navigational interests of 
maritime states65. Article 46 of UNCLOS 1982 defines an archipelagic state as “a state 
constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands.” 
In order to have a better view of the concept of an archipelagic state, the 
definition of archipelago should be discussed first. Archipelago has been defined in 
Article 46 (b) as “a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters 
and other natural features which are so closely inter-related that such islands, waters and 
other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or 
which historically have been regarded as such.” In its strict geographical terms, 
archipelago means a formation of two or more islands which geographically may be 
considered as a whole. 66 It includes not just insular natural formations but also non-
insular formations, like reefs, and the areas of the sea around them among which there 
must be a close interrelationship thereby constructively forming a single physical and 
                                                            
64 Ibid.,  at  p, 101 
65 Supra, footnote 3 at p. 120 
66 Clive R. Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1979 at p. 60 
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economic entity. 67 The two or more islands must be so situated as to be capable of being 
geographically considered as a whole or a unit. 68 In this regard, the mere existence of 
islands does not qualify as an archipelago if they are not closely situated physically 
through interconnecting waters to form as a whole.  
Taking into consideration the definition and descriptions of an archipelago, an 
archipelagic state is comprised of groups of islands that are described in paragraph (b) 
Article 46. There are several aspects to be noted in the definition of an archipelagic 
state.69 First, it was adopted to reflect the actual situation of states having archipelagic 
claims such as Papua New Guinea which is comprised of a main archipelago and two 
other archipelagos, or Fiji which has far flung islands, or in case of Indonesia and the 
Philippines which both have only one archipelago. Secondly, the requirements of Article 
46 must be complied with where a group of islands cannot constitute an archipelagic 
state if the islands are not closely interrelated as to form an intrinsic geographical, 
economic and political entity or have not been historically regarded as such.  
In line with this, if a particular country consists of a group of islands, 
interconnecting waters and other natural features, it may establish its claim as 
archipelagic state provided that the islands form an intrinsic geographical, economic and 
political entity or the islands must be subject to a single government. 70 Additionally, a 
country may establish a claim upon the condition that the islands, parts of islands, 
intervening waters and other natural features have historically been regarded as an 
intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity. 71  The historical factor is an 
alternative to geographical, economic and political requirements rather than additional 
                                                            
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Supra, footnote 18 at p. 126 
70 Supra, footnote 20 at p. 171 
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thereto. 72 Hence, the primary consideration to be regarded as an archipelago is the 
proximity of groups of islands to one another in order to form one geographical entity.  
Related to the definition provided under paragraph (a), it requires that an 
archipelagic state be constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos. 73  It further 
requires the exclusion of continental states which possess non-coastal archipelagos like 
Denmark, with respect to the Faroes; Equador pertaining to the Galapagos Islands and 
Spain with regard to the Canaries. 74  This means that these States cannot draw 
archipelagic baselines around such islands. 75 Simply put, the archipelagic regime is not 
applicable to groups of islands belonging to continental states.   
Consequent to the concept of archipelagic states is the archipelagic waters or the 
waters within or enclosed by the archipelagic straight baseline system which falls under 
special legal regime. Such waters are neither internal waters nor territorial sea although 
they bear similarities with the latter. 76  Article 47 of UNCLOS states that “an 
archipelagic state may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points 
of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago...” It bears stressing that 
baselines have a direct connection to the outer limits of maritime zones because the 
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and 
continental shelf of an archipelagic state are measured initially from the baseline. For 
purposes of delimiting its internal waters, the archipelagic state may draw closing lines 
across the mouth of a river, the mouth of a bay or the outermost harbour works. 77 The 
waters so enclosed are internal waters, not archipelagic waters based on Article 50 
considering that it is within the archipelagic baseline. 78 This means that closing lines 
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apply only with respect to the mouth of the rivers, across bays and using permanent 
harbour works in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11 of UNCLOS, respectively, and 
delimitation under Article 50 refers to the establishment of a line delimiting the internal 
waters and separating those waters from archipelagic waters. 79  However, before an 
archipelagic state may draw archipelagic baselines, it must satisfy the objective criteria 
under Article 47, as well as the requirement that it consists of one or more 
archipelagos.80   
 It may be recalled that among the opposing views to the establishment of this 
new regime in international law is the absence of objective criteria to which the regime 
should apply. 81 However, this issue was basically addressed by Article 47 by providing 
objective standards for drawing archipelagic baselines which include: maximum length 
of baseline (not exceeding 100 nautical miles); the minimum and maximum water-to-
land ratios within those baselines; conformity of the baselines to the general 
configuration of the archipelago and the restrictions on the point to and from which 
baselines shall be drawn. 82 Article 47 also addressed the problem of protecting and  
preserving the rights of neighbouring states which may be affected by the adoption of 
archipelagic baselines, through paragraph 5 and 6, respectively, which specifically 
provides that the baseline shall not be applied is such a manner as to cut off from the 
high seas or the exclusive economic zone and territorial sea of another State and that 
existing rights and all other legitimate interests traditionally exercised by the 
neighbouring state shall continue and be respected. 83  In effect, these principles meet the 
objectives of the archipelagic states to effectively control its territory and at the same 
time recognize the interests of other states. 
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In line with being an archipelagic state, it exercises sovereignty over the waters 
enclosed by the archipelagic baseline including the superjacent airspace, subjacent 
seabed and subsoil and all the resources contained therein, pursuant to Article 49. This 
right is subject to a number of rights enjoyed by third states deriving from existing 
agreements so as to prevent conflict between the rights of archipelagic states under 
UNCLOS and its obligation under these agreements. 84  
 
2.3 Struggle to Achieve Recognition of the Archipelagic Principle  
 
 As the forerunners for the recognition of archipelagic principles, the Philippines 
and Indonesia together with Fiji and Mauritius waited a long period of time for the 
international community to recognize the archipelagic principle. These states being 
oceanic nations submitted documents to the Sub-Committee II to seek the establishment 
of fundamental principles applicable to an archipelagic state to include its rights over the 
waters within its baselines as well as the right to innocent passage by other states. 85 
Emphases were made on the right of every state to exercise control over its territory and 
the difficulty in exercising it by reason of the complicated island networks as well as the 
absence of international rules to govern archipelagos.  It is worth mentioning that the 
claim for special regime was based on the concept of the right of the state to draw 
straight baselines around its outermost islands for purposes of measuring its territorial 
sea from the baseline and to further consider the waters enclosed as internal waters. 86  
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  State Practice 
 
 Prior to UNCLOS III, the Philippines and Indonesia already had an established 
state practice regarding the delimitation of their territorial waters and determining the 
status around and surrounding their islands87. In the case of the Philippines, it submitted 
a note verbale to the Secretary General of United Nations in 1955, claiming exclusive 
rights over waters within the coordinates of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which provides 
for the cession of the Philippine archipelago by Spain to the United States and specifies 
geographical coordinates for the area of the ceded territory. 88 It claimed that “all waters 
around, between and connecting different islands belonging to the Philippine 
archipelago, irrespective of their width and dimension form an integral part of the 
national or inland water, subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the Philippines. ”  
Also, in 1961, the Philippine Congress enacted the Republic Act 3048 (as 
amended by RA 5446) defining specifically the seventy-nine (79) baselines drawn from 
the outermost points of the archipelago, averaging 35 miles each in length and further 
describing the waters enclosed by these baselines as internal waters placed under the 
sovereignty of the Philippines. 89 In its 1973 Constitution, particularly in Article 1, it 
defines national territory as “comprising of all islands and waters and all other territories 
belonging to the Philippines by historic rights or legal title including the territorial sea, 
the air space, the subsoil, the seabed, the insular shelves and other submarine areas over 
which the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction. The waters around, between and 
connecting the islands of the archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and dimension, 
form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. ”90  
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 On the other hand, Indonesia proclaimed in 1957 its archipelagic concept and 
issued a Government Declaration concerning the Water Areas of the Republic of 
Indonesia otherwise known as Djuanda Declaration. 91  It defines both Indonesia’s 
territorial waters and internal waters by declaring that “the delimitation of territorial sea  
is measured from the baselines connecting the outermost points of the islands of 
Indonesia” and it provides that “all waters surrounding, between and connecting the 
islands constituting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension and breadth, are 
integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state, and therefore, parts of the internal 
or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian state. ”92   
 Both the Philippines and Indonesia received protests from major maritime 
powers during that time including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and the 
Netherlands with the view that the declaration violated international law and constituted 
a major encroachment on freedom of movement on the world’s ocean. 93 They expressed 
concern about passage through the archipelagic waters particularly with reference to 
warships. 94  The oppositions were based on their view that the freedom of their 
respective fleets, whether commercial or military, to navigate through the waters of the 
two biggest archipelagic countries would be curtailed and hampered.   
The proposal for the recognition of a special regime is founded on the protection 
of national territory and promotion of unity within the country. It may be recalled that 
during the deliberation before the Sub Committee II in 1974, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Fiji and Mauritius stressed that the concept was essential to the national unity, political 
stability, economic, social cultural cohesiveness and territorial integrity. 95 Their waters 
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would become separating rather than unifying factors if not enclosed and that this would 
form pockets of the high seas, open to the activities which might endanger the unity, 
security and territorial integrity of the country. 96 The sovereignty of the archipelagic 
states and the preservation of same are vital to their basic national unity and the 
protection of their waters from intrusion is crucial to their national security97. Although 
many countries supported the proposal, it was pointed out that the regime would entail 
problems concerning the existing uses of the sea considering that some archipelagic 
waters are situated in the middle of inter-oceanic commercial navigation, hence, passage 
through said waters should be unrestricted and recognized and should be more than 
simple right of innocent passage. 98  The proponents were in effect criticised on the 
absence of formulated rules on passage through archipelagic waters. 
 It is in this regard that the proposal was amended to include provisions on the 
right of innocent passage, the extent to which the state could regulate such passage as 
well as the designation of sea lanes and set limitations on their powers to make laws and 
regulations on the innocent passage of foreign ships through archipelagic waters. 99 It 
was emphasised that a delicate balance had to be struck to ensure minimum interference 
with interests of maritime states as well as the legitimate interest of transit State. 100 
Hence, in order to reconcile the conflicting interests of the sponsoring states and other 
States opposed to the regime, they had to limit their powers to enact rules and 
regulations that would govern the passage of foreign vessels through their waters, 
thereby putting first the interests of other States in order to gain recognition of 
archipelagic principle. Based on the foregoing, it is worth mentioning that the great 
efforts of these states to seek a regime that would unify their respective territories for the 
sake of security and integrity paved the way subject to the interests of other states.   
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Consequently, a new maritime regime of a hybrid nature has been accepted in the 
emerging law of the sea and the division of the seas into high seas, territorial seas and 
internal waters now includes archipelagic waters. 101  In their 25 year struggle for 
recognition as an oceanic archipelagic regime, they have gained advantage by unifying 
their respective territories. As pointed out by these states, sovereignty and exclusive 
jurisdictions over the waters that serves as links of communication to every island were 
vital to archipelagic states, not only to their economy but also to their national security 
and territorial integrity. 102 Another advantage is that the extent of the interconnecting 
waters is utilized by the inhabitants of the islands for economic purposes, to include the 
exploitation of the resources thereof for food and wealth. 103  
As previously discussed, the very intention of archipelagic states is to protect 
their territorial integrity and national security. This new approach reflected the national 
outlook of the archipelagic states as nation states and their aspiration to acquire 
territorial unity. 104  The claim for recognition for a special regime does not imply 
acquiring extended territory but for self preservation. It is crucial for them to establish 
maritime boundaries that would define their territorial limits as sovereign states.    
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CHAPTER III  
 
BOUNDARY SETTING IN RELATION TO SECURITY 
 
 
 
There are five key maritime zones which the coastal state may claim: internal 
waters, territorial waters, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 
the continental shelf and in case of an archipelagic state, it may claim archipelagic 
waters within archipelagic baselines. 105  These maritime zones established under 
UNCLOS 1982 are of crucial importance to coastal states because they afford them 
security in the face of threats of cross-border crimes such as smuggling, illegal migration 
and ultimately the threat of terrorism and the use of military force. 106 For this reason, 
coastal states assert their right to maritime zones and at the same time set their respective 
borders in order to determine span of control over their territory.  
It is in this regard that the archipelagic states particularly the Philippines and 
Indonesia have become conscious of their national security taking into account the 
configuration of the territory where islands spanning a large part of the ocean have made 
it difficult for them to exercise effective central authority together with ease of intrusion 
by outsiders107. Insofar as the exclusive interest is concerned, the most important fact 
here is that a political entity is comprised of a group of islands separated by expanses of 
water where exchange and travel between various parts of the state greatly depends on 
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the use of the ocean 108 . It becomes extraordinarily difficult to exercise control of 
implementation of local policies and matters of special importance to all states such as 
immigration, entry of alien and import and export problems109. Also, the military aspect 
of security has become complicated because of the geographical situation. The state can 
hardly maintain a regular watch over all means of access to the various islands or even 
to a large island since the ocean areas involved are so vast which makes espionage and 
surveillance from the outside less difficult. 110 Hence, there is the desire to enclose their 
respective islands and interconnecting waters within a single unit to insulate them from 
outside intrusion111.  
 As sovereign States, it is customary for archipelagic states to take special and 
vital interest over their maritime zones. They have to find or establish measures within 
the bounds of international law to delimit their boundaries to protect their territorial 
integrity.  
 
3.1 Archipelagic Boundary Delimitation 
 
 The recognition of archipelagic principle in international law allows archipelagic 
states to delimit their respective boundaries and draw baselines that will delineate the 
areas of waters and land that are to be measured. Article 47 of UNCLOS prescribes 
boundary delimitation of the archipelagic State to determine the general extent of the 
archipelago. It also deals with rules for safeguards for neighbouring states which might 
be affected as well as the recording and publication of archipelagic baselines.112 The 
following provisions of Article 47 of UNCLOS illustrate boundary delimitation: 
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 1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines 
joining the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago 
provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and 
an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the land area of 
the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. 
 
  2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, 
except that up to 3 percent of the total number of baselines enclosing 
any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 
125 nautical miles. 
 
  3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable 
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. 
 
  4. Such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, 
unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently 
above sea level have been built on them or where a low tide elevation 
is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breath of 
the territorial sea from the nearest island. 
 
  5.The system of such baselines shall not be applied by an 
archipelagic State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or 
the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea of another State. 
 
  6. If a part of the archipelagic waters of archipelagic State lies 
between two parts of an immediately adjacent neighbouring State, 
existing rights and all other legitimate interests which the latter State 
has traditionally exercised in such waters and all rights stipulated by 
agreement between those States shall continue to be respected. 
 
  7. For purposes of computing the ratio of water to land under 
paragraph 1, land areas may include waters lying within the fringing 
reefs of islands and atolls, including that part of a steep-sided oceanic 
plateau which is enclosed or nearly enclosed by a chain of limestone 
islands and drying reefs lying on the perimeter of the plateau. 
 
  8. The baselines drawn in accordance with this article shall be shown 
on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. 
Alternatively, lists of geographical co-ordinates of points, specifying 
the geodetic datum, may be substituted. 
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  9. The archipelagic State shall give due publicity to such charts or 
lists of geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each 
such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
 
 Based on the foregoing, the following rules must be satisfied by the archipelagic 
state in drawing baselines: the archipelagic state must include the main islands; the 
designated baseline must enclose an area of sea at least as large as the area of enclosed 
land but not more than nine times that of the land area; the baseline may not exceed 100 
nautical miles in length except that up to three percent of the total number of baselines 
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 
nautical miles and it must not deviate from the general configuration of the archipelago 
to any appreciable extent.113 
  Also, regarding the first requirement, “main island” may be construed, depending 
on the interest of the archipelagic state, as the largest island of the archipelago or the 
most populous island or most economically productive islands or the most pre-eminent 
in a historical or cultural sense.114  
Further, the purposes of water-to-land ratio of 1:1 and 9:1 are to provide 
objective criterion for the concept of an archipelagic state, to limit its application to 
relatively compact oceanic island groups and to meet the claims of archipelagic states 
participating in the Conference. 115  The lower ratio was selected to exclude those 
archipelagos that are dominated by one or two large islands or parts of islands between 
which there are comparatively small areas of interconnecting seas such as, the United 
Kingdom, Madagascar and Cuba; whereas the upper ratio excludes those widely 
dispersed archipelagos because it is impossible to enclose large areas of seas within 
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archipelagic baselines as in the case of Tuvalu and Kiribati.116   In this regard, the 
countries that could enclose waters approximately within the prescribed ratio are 
Indonesia and the Philippines with 1:1.8 and 1.1.2, respectively.117  
In sum, the very idea of Article 47 is to have a compact and integrated territory 
through straight archipelagic baselines that would connect the islands and waters of the 
archipelagic State. The archipelagic baseline is the starting point from which the extent 
of territorial sea, contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf 
will be measured.   
 Relatedly, there are baseline options for archipelagic states that are consistent 
with UNCLOS which could be identified from existing state practices. 118 First is the 
single baseline system. This option allows the inclusion of all the islands and other 
natural features and the interconnecting waters that constitute the archipelagic State 
within a single composite baseline system. The states like Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Cape Verde have applied this system in enclosing their respective archipelagos. Second 
option is the multiple baseline system which allows the drawing of archipelagic 
baselines around each archipelago forming the archipelagic state. However, each 
archipelago should be consistent with Article 46(b) and each enclosure should satisfy 
Article 47 on the drawing of archipelagic baselines. The country that was able to apply 
this option is Solomon Islands with five archipelagos and has drawn baseline around 
each archipelagos. Third is the non-archipelagic straight baseline system. This option 
can be applied by States which fall within the definition of archipelagic state and 
predominantly consist of one large island. They may draw straight baselines which tie 
the coastal islands to the main island, similar to mainland coasts that are fringed by 
coastal islands or coastal archipelagos. The advantage of this is that the waters inside the 
                                                            
116 Supra, footnote 20 at p. 176 
117 Supra, footnote 3 at p. 123 
118 Supra, footnote 18 at pp. 135-136 
  29
straight baselines then become internal waters rather than archipelagic waters. 
Madagascar and Cuba have chosen this option in their respective legislations.    
 
Status of Waters Enclosed and Rights Accorded to the Archipelagic State 
 
 There are various terms used to describe the status of archipelagic waters. There 
are views that waters landward of straight archipelagic baselines should be described in 
the same manner as in the case of waters enclosed landward of the straight baseline 
system as provided under the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea which was 
described as internal119. However, in order not to deviate from the accepted categories of 
internal waters, territorial sea and straits used for international navigation, the 4-State 
Drafts and the United Kingdom emphasized the sui generis character of the waters 
enclosed by archipelagic baselines by adopting a new term archipelagic waters. 120 
Hence, the waters within or enclosed by the archipelagic baselines are referred as 
archipelagic waters.  
 
The legal status of archipelagic waters is embodied in Article 49 of UNCLOS 
where it specifically states the following: 
 
  1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters 
enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance Article 47, 
described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance 
from the coast. 
  2. Their sovereignty extends to the air space over archipelagic waters, 
as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. 
 
  3. This sovereignty is exercised subject to this Part.  
 
                                                            
119 Supra, footnote 66 at p. 68 
120 Supra, footnote 9 at p. 114 
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  4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes established in this Part shall  
not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters 
including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its 
sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and 
the resources contained therein. 
 
  The archipelagic waters should be distinguished from internal waters. The 
concept of internal waters is retained for bays, river mouths and ports in accordance with 
Articles 9, 10 and 11. The internal waters in this regard are those created by delimiting 
closing lines across bays, rivers and ports, therefore, subject to normal rules while 
archipelagic waters are those enclosed by or within the archipelagic baselines. There is 
no right of foreign passage over internal waters.121 On the other hand, the archipelagic 
state exercises sovereignty over archipelagic waters including seabed and subsoil therein 
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast but the exercise thereof is subject to 
some limitations in favour of rights of passage for foreign ships and aircrafts.122 
 These distinctions connote that the archipelagic state exercises absolute 
jurisdiction over its internal waters while its rights over archipelagic waters are subject 
to certain conditions. It is similar to rights over territorial sea where foreign vessels 
enjoy innocent passage and transit passage. With regard to the boundary setting of the 
archipelagic state, it meets the objective and requirements of unity and national integrity 
of the archipelagic state. It may be understood that if the waters will not be enclosed by 
baselines, they will possess the character of international straits where passage of foreign 
vessels is a matter of right.   
 
3.2 Introduction of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage (ASLP) 
 
 It may be recalled that the issue of passage through archipelagic waters was 
controversial during the deliberation stage of UNCLOS III. The opposition of major 
                                                            
121 Supra, footnote 107 at p. 164 
122 Ibid., at p. 162 
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maritime powers and other states was overwhelming by reason of the obstacles they 
would face in commercial navigation, strategic movement of military forces as well as 
the right of innocent passage and other existing rights in the event that waters would be 
enclosed and placed under jurisdiction of the archipelagic states.  
Oppositions contended that once the archipelagic state acquired the exclusive 
rights over the waters previously regarded as high seas but now placed under the 
sovereignty of that state, foreign military aircrafts or vessels would have no right to 
navigate or fly over those waters. On the other hand, the archipelagic states argued on 
the grounds of territorial integrity and national security. In order that the archipelagic 
concept be acceptable to maritime powers and other states, negotiation and compromise 
on navigational rights over archipelagic waters were made. This is where the concept of 
archipelagic sea lane passage was introduced as a compromise for gaining archipelagic 
state status.  
 Rights of passage of all states through and over archipelagic waters are the major 
limitation to the sovereignty of the archipelagic state123. Worth mentioning are the two 
groups of rights of other states over archipelagic waters introduced in UNCLOS III; 
these are non-navigational and navigational rights. The former consists of previous 
rights being exercised by neighbouring States in archipelagic waters by virtue of 
agreement prior to becoming as such; whereas, the latter includes right of innocent 
passage which had been present since UNCLOS I and the new concept of archipelagic 
sea lane passage124.  
The existing agreements are those entered into by the archipelagic States with 
other States that will be affected once an archipelagic State draws its baseline. Taken as 
example are the immediately adjacent States of Malaysia and Indonesia. They entered 
                                                            
123 Robert Beckman, Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage In Southeast Asia, in Chong Guan Kwa, John 
Kristen Skogan Maritime security in Southeast Asia, New York: Routledge, 2007 at p. 119, 
http://books.google.com  22 February 2010 
124 Supra, footnote 18 at p. 158 
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into an agreement on 25 February 1982 on the breadth of navigational corridor entitled 
The Treaty Between Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia Relating to the Legal 
Regime of Archipelagic State and the Rights of Malaysia in the Territorial Sea and 
Archipelagic Waters as well as in the Airspace above the Territorial Sea and 
Archipelagic Waters and the Territory of the Republic of Indonesia Lying Between East 
and West Malaysia, (otherwise known as Jakarta Treaty)125. The treaty provides a 20 
mile corridor between their borders particularly on east and west part for navigation 
purposes. It means that the stipulations regarding the use of waters enclosed by 
archipelagic baselines stay although such waters were placed under the jurisdiction of 
Indonesia. 
 Relatedly, non-navigational rights include the interest of other States in lying 
submarine cables within the scope of “direct communication”126. The establishment of 
archipelagic baselines does not affect this particular right of other States. 
 On the other hand, navigational rights involve right of innocent passage and 
archipelagic sea lanes passage. Similar to the innocent passage rights that could be 
exercised by a State over the territorial sea of another State, it could also be exercised 
through archipelagic waters pursuant to Article 52 of UNCLOS. The rule on innocent 
passage shall be governed by Part II Section 3 of UNCLOS127. Passage, in this regard, 
means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of (a) traversing that sea 
without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal 
waters or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port 
facility and it shall be continuous and expeditious except for anchoring in normal access 
of navigation, in force majeure or when assisting another vessel128.  Also, Article 19 of 
                                                            
125 Ibid., at p159 
126 Supra, footnote 9  at p. 117 
127 UNCLOS Article 52 – (1) Subject to article 53 and without prejudice to article 50, ships of all States enjoy the 
right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters, in accordance with Part II, section 3. (2) The archipelagic 
State may, without discrimination in form on in fact among foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the 
protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published.  
128 UNCLOS Article 18 
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UNCLOS provides that a vessel exercising the right of innocent passage must not 
engage in conduct which is prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal 
state. Further, it is a requirement under Article 21 for foreign vessels exercising the right 
of innocent passage through archipelagic waters to comply with laws and regulations of 
the archipelagic State as well as the international rules against collision at sea.  
 Another navigational right is referred to as the specialized regime of the right of 
archipelagic sea lane passage.  Based on Article 53 of UNCLOS, archipelagic sea lane 
passage means the exercise of the rights of navigation and overflight in normal mode 
solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or 
an exclusive economic zone129. This right could be exercised in two instances, first, in 
all normal passage routes used for international navigation or over flight through or over 
archipelagic waters and its adjacent territorial sea; second, in sea lanes or air routes 
which the concerned archipelagic state has specifically designated130.  
 
3.3 Aspects of Right of Archipelagic Sea lane Passage 
 
This particular regime guarantees that ships and aircrafts of other States have the 
right to pass through and over archipelagic waters on designated sea lanes and air 
routes131. It is very much different from innocent passage. The following instances 
constitute distinctions between two principles of innocent passage and archipelagic sea 
lane passage with regard to passage through archipelagic waters132: 
 
                                                            
129 Supra, footnote 12  at p. 522 
130 Supra, footnote 23  at p. 318  
131 Supra, footnote 123 at p. 119 
132 Hashim Djalal, Indonesia’s Archipelagic Sea Lanes, in Robert Cribb and Michelle Ford (Editors) 
Indonesia Beyond the Water’s Edge, Pasir Panjang: ISEAS Publishing  at p. 60 
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1. The right of innocent passage requires that submarines and 
other under water vehicles should navigate on the surface, 
showing their flags; whereas in archipelagic sea lane passage, 
underwater vehicle is allowed to navigate under normal mode 
which is possible that it pass underwater; 
2. There is no right of over flight in areas where innocent 
passage is allowed while in    archipelagic sea lane, over flight is 
permitted; 
 
3. The right of innocent passage could be suspended in certain 
cases like when there is military exercise or the State has to deal 
with local crises but archipelagic sea lane passage cannot be 
suspended, it may only be substituted; 
 
4. With regard to warships, there are no precise rules under 
international law that would require countries to give prior notice 
on innocent passage of warships; other countries necessitate 
prior notice while some do not require but in archipelagic sea 
lane passage, prior notification on the passage of warship 
through it is explicitly not required;  
 
5. The provisions on archipelagic sea lane do not include the 
possibility of cooperation between the archipelagic State and 
user States in terms of establishment of safety rules on 
navigation and the prevention and control of pollution from ship 
through archipelagic sea lane are not covered by this concept. 
 
It may be understood from the above mentioned distinctions that the rules on 
innocent passage are more stringent than that of the archipelagic sea lane passage. 
Violations of conditions on innocent passage that would affect national security of the 
State will give rise to suspension of the right. However, the same cannot be done in 
archipelagic sea lane passage because it is designed for continuous, unobstructed and 
expeditious passage of foreign vessels.  
Another aspect of archipelagic sea lane passage is that it is almost similar to the 
right of transit passage through and over straits used for international navigation. Transit 
passage means the exercise of freedom of navigation and overflight, in accordance with 
Part III UNCLOS, solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the 
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strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part 
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone (Article 38). It is the same as freedom of 
the high seas in the aspect of continuous and expeditious passage133. Moreover, Article 
54 of UNCLOS specifically states that provisions on transit passage shall be applied 
mutatis mutandis to the regime of archipelagic sea lane passage. Emphasis should be 
made on the following similarities134: 
1. The rights of transit passage and archipelagic sea lane passage include 
overflight for aircraft as well as navigation for ships; 
 
2. Ships exercising right of transit or archipelagic sea lane passage may 
use their normal mode of transit, hence, surface warship may pass 
through sea lane in a manner necessary for their security to include 
formation steaming and recovery of aircraft; 
 
3. Both rights may never be suspended for reason of national security, 
even temporarily. 
 
The foregoing circumstances do not apply to right of innocent passage. On the 
other hand, these rights differ from one another under the following aspects:135 
1. Transit passage signifies exercise of freedom, while archipelagic sea 
lanes passage is the exercise of the rights of navigation or overflight;  
 
2. As a matter of general right, ships and aircrafts enjoy right of transit passage 
through straits. On the other hand, they enjoy a general right of sea lanes 
passage if the archipelagic state designates; otherwise this right “may” be 
exercised through the routes used for international navigation; 
 
3. Unlike in the case of transit passage, both sea lanes and air routes must be 
established on axis lines within archipelagic waters; 
 
                                                            
133 Supra, footnote 9 at p. 89 
134 Supra, footnote 123 at p. 119 
135 Supra, footnote 13 at p. 25 
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4. All normal passage routes used for international navigation should be 
included in designating archipelagic sea lanes and air routes, whereas; it is 
not a requirement in transit passage; 
 
5. The right of overflight under archipelagic sea lanes passage is restricted to 
air routes above sea lanes, unlike in the freedom of overflight within transit 
passage regime. This means that overflight should be made strictly above the 
designated sea lanes or routes normally used for international navigation, in 
the absence of designated sea lanes. 
   
Additionally, although its designation is not mandatory as the phrase ‘may 
designate’ is expressly stated in Article 53, the right of archipelagic sea lane passage 
applies by default because of paragraphs (4) and (12) thereof which provide that sea 
lanes shall include all passage routes used for international navigation through 
archipelagic waters and that if no sea lanes are designated, the right may be exercised 
through routes normally used for international navigation136.  
In the event the archipelagic sea lane will be established in narrow channels, the 
archipelagic State may prescribe traffic separation scheme for the safe passage of ships 
based on Article 53 (6). Also, the proposal to establish a sea lane has to be approved by 
a competent international organization, in this case the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) which has jurisdiction over shipping and navigation questions137. 
Once the proposal for its designation is approved by the IMO, ships and aircraft of all 
states, to include military ships and aircraft, may enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lane 
passage continuously and expeditiously through the archipelagic waters138.  
Considering that archipelagic sea lane passage is similar to transit passage in 
major aspects, the rights afforded to archipelagic states over archipelagic sea lane are 
very limited. It grants maritime nations non-suspendable rights of passage through an 
                                                            
136 Supra, footnote 132 at p. 62 
137 Supra, footnote 18 at p. 169 
138 Supra, footnote 123 at p. 120 
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archipelago 139 . This is the greatest among the considerable responsibilities of the 
archipelagic States to the international maritime community and the price they have to 
pay for the advantages of gaining archipelagic status140. 
 
Purpose of Archipelagic Sea Lanes  
 
 As provided under Article 53 of UNCLOS, an archipelagic state may designate 
sea lanes and air routes above them for continuous and expeditious passage of foreign 
ships and aircraft through its archipelagic waters and territorial sea and air space above. 
It shall include normal routes used for international navigation. The sea lane connects 
one part of the high seas or exclusive economic zone to another part of the high seas or 
EEZ or territorial sea of another state. In order to reach the other part of the high seas, 
the vessel could traverse through the archipelagic sea lane. Although it is similar to 
transit passage in straits used for international navigation, it is adjusted to reflect the 
differences between the vast expanses of ocean that become archipelagic waters as well 
as narrow passages that comprise most straits used for international navigation141.   
 Basically, archipelagic sea lanes cater to the needs of user states so they could 
have uninterrupted navigation through archipelagic waters. They facilitate the 
unobstructed passage of military vessels and aircrafts over the waters of the archipelagic 
state142.  
In order to protect its maritime security in relation to the establishment of 
archipelagic sea lane passage, the archipelagic state may, under Article 42 UNCLOS, 
adopt laws and regulations relating to sea lane passage in respect of safety of navigation, 
                                                            
139 Chris Forward, Archipelagic Sea Lanes in Indonesia – Their Legality in International Law, Maritime 
Journal 2009 at p 153  http://martimejournal.murdoch.edu.au 21 June 2010 
140 Supra, footnote 20 at p. 178 
141 Supra, footnote 21 at p. 466 
142 Supra, footnote 18 at p. 168 
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prevention and control of pollution, prevention of fishing and the loading and unloading 
of any commodity, currency or person or sanitary laws or regulation.   
 
3.4 Maintaining Territorial Integrity 
 
 In asserting their rights to maritime spaces, the archipelagic states have to agree 
to the establishment of sea lanes for passage of foreign ships in the archipelagic waters. 
Although the archipelagic states preferred the use of these sea lanes to be subject to the 
rule of innocent passage, demands from maritime states eventually led to a regime of 
passage comparable to transit passage which is less stringent143.  The interests of the user 
states have been taken into account in order that their freedom of navigation will not be 
obstructed.  
 However, the archipelagic states have to balance their interests of maintaining 
territorial integrity with the right of user states to navigate uninterruptedly through the 
archipelagic waters. The two biggest archipelagic states and the primary proponents of 
archipelagic principles, Indonesia and the Philippines have to consider their respective 
security interests, economic interests as well as the environment.  
 In protecting the security interest, archipelagic state may limit the number of sea 
lanes designated and may chose the shortest possible routes or it may limit certain types 
of vessels or vessels carrying certain types of cargos 144 . The archipelagic state is 
permitted to adopt laws or regulations that will govern the exercise of archipelagic sea 
lanes passage but should not result to hampering or impairing the relevant right of 
passage145 The vessels and aircrafts are obliged to comply with the following conditions 
                                                            
143 Supra, footnote 107 at p. 161 
144 Supra, footnote 18 at p. 170 
145 Supra, footnote 23 at p. 319 
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under Articles 39 and 40 of UNCLOS while exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes 
passage: 146 
1. ships and aircraft exercising right of archipelagic sea lane  
passage shall proceed without delay; 
 
2. they are not allowed to cause any threat to the security of 
archipelagic State; 
 
3. ships shall comply with international rules for preventing 
collisions between ships; 
 
4. they shall take necessary precautionary measures to prevent 
causing of pollution to the marine environment.  
 
 While it is true that designating archipelagic sea lane passage is the ultimate 
responsibility of archipelagic States to the international community, it shall also be 
considered that maintaining territorial integrity is paramount to other obligations. There 
are certain important interests which the archipelagic state cannot give up, for instance 
its maritime security, to satisfy concerns of the user states. Hence, designation of 
archipelagic sea lanes shall be viewed as the greatest contribution of archipelagic states 
to the international community, particularly to major maritime powers because their 
right to navigation through archipelagic waters is being upheld and guaranteed.  
                                                            
146 Supra, footnote 21 at p. 334 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
INDONESIA’S COMPLIANCE 
 
 
  
The archipelagic sea lanes passage (ASLP) is extremely important to 
international commercial and naval navigation particularly through Indonesian and 
Philippine archipelagic waters and international straits. 147  Major maritime powers 
claimed uninterrupted passage through these archipelagos for reasons of international 
trade and strategic security, like the United States for the transit of its submarine to and 
from Guam, as well as Japan for the passage of its oil tankers to and from the Persian 
Gulf.148 From the view point of these maritime powers these archipelagic states hamper 
free navigation because they lie at the crossroad of two great oceans, Indian and Pacific 
Oceans. Indonesia, in particular, the largest archipelagic state in the world with 5.8 
million square kilometres consisting of 0.3 million square kilometres of territorial sea, 
2.8 million square kilometres of archipelagic waters and 2.7 million square kilometres of 
EEZ, is lying not only between these oceans but also between two continents, Asia and 
Australia.149 Hence, absence of sea lanes would considerably delay navigation activities 
of their commercial and military fleets because they have to take a long route.  
                                                            
147  David L. Larson, Innocent, Transit and Archipelagic Sea Lane Passage Ocean Development and 
International Law Vol. 18 No. 4, 1987 at p. 417  
148 Ibid.  
 
149 Arif Havas Oegroseno, Indonesia’s  Maritime Boundaries in Robert Cribb and Michelle Ford (Editors) 
Indonesia Beyond the Water’s Edge, Pasir Panjang ,ISEAS Publishing 2009 at p. 49 
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Figure 1 Map of the Republic of Indonesia 
 
 
  Source: Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Republic of Indonesia http://www.dkp.go.id  5 July 2010 
 
 It was previously pointed out that it is not mandatory upon the archipelagic state 
to designate archipelagic sea lanes passage. However, if it chooses to designate, Article 
53(4) requires that the designation includes all normal passage routes used for 
international navigation. From the Indonesian perspective, this means that it can only 
exercise its full sovereignty over its archipelagic waters if it designates a full regime of 
archipelagic sea lanes through its waters. 150 The fact that a number of straits are also 
located in Indonesia like the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Sunda Strait and 
Lombok Strait, means that there is a need to designate sea lanes which are not 
duplicative for purposes of enhancing safety of navigation, protection of the 
environment and strengthening the security of the maritime domain. 151  
                                                            
150 Supra, footnote 132 at p. 62 
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 In this regard, Indonesia started the process of designating archipelagic sea lanes 
passage in its waters in 1994 by conducting national surveys, and in 1995 it undertook 
national inter-agency coordination. 152  In 1996, it began its consultations with the 
International Hydrographic Organization and with interested user states such as 
Australia, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom on the designation of 
archipelagic sea lanes as well as the rules that will govern the same. 153  Since the 
beginning of the negotiation, it has been the intention of the United States, whose prime 
mission is to strengthen the capability to provide global reach through sea power, to 
ensure that all normal routes and transit through the area would be properly included in 
the designation. 154 With regard to Australia, its concern is not only regional security but 
also economic aspects in case of any erosion of free access through the sea-air gap to 
their north. 155  
On the other hand, Indonesia had taken into account important factors, from 
technical requirements to environmental matters, before the axis of sea lane was 
decided. These include the presence of maritime installations and structures, underwater 
cables and pipelines, the needs of international vessels and aircraft that intend to pass 
through or over Indonesian waters, the capability of law enforcement agencies to 
monitor the archipelagic sea lanes, the maintenance of peace, stability and security in the 
country’s heavily populated coastal zones, the intensity of fishing activities and the need 
to protect marine parks and ecosystems. 156  Considering that the establishment of 
archipelagic sea lanes is on territorial waters of the archipelago, it has to re-adjust its 
archipelagic starting lines in the Natuna Sea.157 
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153 Supra, footnote 132 at p. 63 
154 Mark F. Mayer, Archipelagic Sea Lanes: Designation Factors and Effects on Operational Art, Naval 
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155 Ibid.  
156 Supra, footnote 1132 at p. 63 
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Additionally, Indonesia had indicated that an east – west sea lane through the 
Java Sea, which is a major normal route for international navigation, was not likely to be 
included in the proposal. The United States and Australia which are concerned about the 
non-inclusion of other normal routes opposed the proposal stressing on the requirements 
of UNCLOS 1982 that all normal routes should be included in designation of 
archipelagic sea lanes, hence it urged Indonesia not to submit a proposal unless it 
include all normal routes. 158 Notwithstanding, Indonesia submitted in 1996 its proposal 
to IMO for the designation of archipelagic sea lanes passage in accordance with Article 
53(9), with rules to govern their use which resulted from coordination with the user 
states.159  
 
4.1 The Indonesian Submission 
 
 The United States maintains its position that the Indonesian submission should 
be regarded as a partial designation only; that the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage 
shall continue to be applied in routes used for international navigation through the 
archipelago and that the right of innocent passage should not be affected by the 
designation of archipelagic sea lanes passage.160 Australia’s view in this regard is that 
the proposed mechanism shall be interpreted in line with the issue of normal passage 
routes, number and location of sea lanes and that the outcome of the consideration of the 
proposal shall reflect the balance of interests of the user states and archipelagic state.161 
In line with the Indonesian proposal, the IMO issued Resolution MSC. 71(69) entitled 
Adoption of Amendments to the  General Provisions of Ships’ Routing (RESOLUTION 
                                                            
158 Jonathan P. Edwards, The Development and Operational Impact of Indonesia’s Approved Partial 
System of Archipelagic Sea Lane, Naval War College Report 1999 at p. 16 http://www.dtic.mil 10 May 
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159 Supra, footnote 132 at p. 64 
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161 Ibid.  
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A.572(14), as amended) where the General Provisions for the Adoption, Designation 
and Substitution of Archipelagic Sea Lanes (GPASL) is embodied in Annex 2 thereof to 
serve as guidelines for the adoption of proposals on archipelagic sea lanes (see Annex 
1). GPASL provides the concept of a “partial archipelagic sea lane proposal” which 
means the proposal made by an archipelagic state which does not meet the requirement 
to include all normal passage routes and navigational channels as required by UNCLOS 
(paragraph 2.2). In 1998, in its 69th Maritime Safety Committee session through 
Resolution MSC 72(69) (see Annex 2) the IMO accepted the proposal as partial 
designation of archipelagic sea lanes because it represented only north/south routes.162 
This means that routes used for international navigation which were not covered in the 
proposal remain available for archipelagic sea lanes passage while the remainder of 
archipelagic waters is available for innocent passage.163 With regard to the east-west 
route from the southern end of the Malacca Strait to the Arafura Sea, it will be required 
to satisfy the IMO rules on designation of archipelagic sea lanes passage.  
 The accepted proposal of Indonesia consists of the following three north-south 
routes of archipelagic sea lanes passage:164 
ASL I:   Sunda Strait – Karimata Strait – Natura Sea – South China Sea  
 
ASL II: Lombok Strait – Makasar Strait – Sulawesi Sea 
 
ASL III A: Sawu Sea – Ombai Strait – Banda Sea (West part of Burn Islands) 
– Seram Sea (Eastern part of Mongole Island) – Maluku Sea - 
Pacific Ocean  
 
ASL III B: Timor Sea – Leti Strait – Banda Sea (West part of Burn Islands) – 
Seram Sea (Eastern part of Mongole Island) – Maluku Sea - 
Pacific Ocean  
                                                            
162 Supra, footnote 20 at p. 13  
163 Ibid.  
164 UN DOALOS, Bulletin No.52, New York: United Nations 2003 at p 23; Indonesia Diplomatic 
Handbook at p 137 http://books.google.se 30 June 2010 
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ASLIII C: Arafura Sea – Banda Sea (West part of Burn Islands) – Seram Sea 
(Eastern part of Mongole Island) – Maluku Sea - Pacific Ocean  
 
ASL I facilitates navigation from the Indian Ocean, through Sunda Strait while 
ASL II, the central route, facilitates navigation from Indian Ocean through Lombok 
Strait and Makassar Strait and to Sulawesi Sea and Pacific Ocean and Philippine waters 
and lastly ASL III, which is in the southern part with three branches, facilitates the 
navigation from Timor Sea and Arafura Sea to the Pacific Ocean through Sawu Sea, 
Banda Sea, Seram Sea and Molucca Sea. 165 All these routes were indicated in the map 
submitted to the IMO. It may be noted that the designation did not include east-west 
route although the user states insist on this issue.  
 
Figure 2 Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes I, II and III 
 
 
Source: Resolution MSC.72(69) http://www.imo.org at p. 9 
 
 
The IMO Resolution was subsequently implemented through Indonesian 
Government Decree No. 37/2002 dated 28 June 2002 and referred to as Alur Laut 
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Kepulauan Indonesia (ALKI) which made it the very first archipelagic State to designate 
archipelagic sea lanes passage (Annex 3).166 This decree was primarily based on the 
rules of UNCLOS 1982 and the outcome of consultations with the user states. It 
acknowledges certain rights of user states.167 Article 2(1) thereof provides the right of 
innocent passage of foreign vessels through Indonesian territorial seas and archipelagic 
waters for transiting from one part of the EEZ or high seas to another part of the EEZ or 
high seas; Articles 2, 3 and 11 prescribe the right of archipelagic sea lane passage 
through certain parts of the Indonesian territorial seas and archipelagic waters referred to 
in the Decree as specific archipelagic sea, while Article 4(1) provides the right to 
navigate in normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, direct, expeditious 
passage and unobstructed transit in line with Article 53 (3) of UNCLOS. The Decree 
also requires that ships and aircrafts exercising the right of archipelagic passage and 
overflight are not allowed to deviate more than 25 nautical miles from the axis of the 
archipelagic sea lane and may not navigate or fly closer to the coast than 10% of the 
distance between the nearest points on the islands bordering the sea lane.168   
With the adoption of the proposal and its subsequent enactment into national 
legislation, Indonesia has indicated its intention to balance the interests of the user states 
with its own national interest although the user states continue to press the issue on 
additional routes.    
 
 
 
4.2  The User States’ Perceptions on Indonesia’s Partial ASLP  
Designation  
 
 The prerogative given by UNCLOS to the archipelagic states to submit sea lanes 
that they want to be approved may give rise to a situation where they may only propose 
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a small number of sea lanes for designation that best serve their interest.169 This is 
reflected in the submission of Indonesia which has become the primary concern of the 
United States and Australia because an east-west passage is not included in the 
designation of archipelagic sea lanes passage although it is a normal route under 
UNCLOS. According to a study conducted in the US Naval War College in 1998, 
potential consequences to operational planning elements may impact the operational 
commander in the case that Indonesia fails to provide or designate a sufficient number of 
sea lanes particularly through the east-west corridor. 170  These include effects on the 
sequencing and synchronization of forces if the routes in the archipelago are insufficient 
because alternative routing will be employed; it will expand or extend the overall force 
structure and logistics trail thereby committing more assets to support movements, 
deception actions and operational protection requirements and an increased risk to force 
structure is immediately present because of the funnelling of forces created as both 
commercial and military assets are forced to utilize designated archipelagic sea lanes. 
This means that insufficient routes may reduce the flexibility available to operational 
commanders in passing through Indonesian archipelagic waters which will definitely 
hamper operations. In a related study in 1999, in the case that the limited number of 
archipelagic sea lanes will not affect operational plans, it will still require changes at the 
tactical level where ships will need to remain within the designated sea lane and will no 
longer be able to operate close to the shore for safety reasons.171  
  Relatively, while Indonesia maintains before the international arena that its 
designation of archipelagic sea lanes is only partial and that the right of archipelagic sea 
lanes passage is available to transiting vessels that navigate through normal routes used 
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for international navigation, Government Decree 37/22 provides otherwise.172   It is 
stated in this law that innocent passage is the only right of passage that could be 
exercised outside the three designated sea lanes, which creates difficulty for transiting 
vessels.173 
 Considering that the user states are persistent in their stand that east-west route 
passage is considered as normal route, the US asserted what it claimed to be customary 
right, sent an aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and five fighter aircrafts on manoeuvres 
near the island of Bawean in Java Sea in July 2003, which created inconvenience in 
Indonesia.174 Five F18 Hornet jets escorting the aircraft carrier were detected by Air 
Force radar manoeuvring for more than 2 hours over Bawean Island in East Java. 
Indonesian government officially lodged its “deep concern” about the incident through 
US Ambassador in Indonesia during that time, stating that the US Navy F18 Hornets 
may be violating Indonesia’s airspace.175 Aside from this incident, it has been noted that 
some user states claim that they are passing through international waters even if they are 
navigating through Indonesian waters and even in the designated archipelagic sea lanes. 
Indonesia is not pleased with this perception but it has so far tolerated the breaches for 
the sake of understanding the balance that was so painstakingly negotiated over many 
years in order to avoid unnecessary conflict.176   
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4.3 Present Interpretation of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage  
 
The issues raised by the user states particularly the United States and Australia 
were all embodied in the GPASL. The designation of archipelagic sea lanes passage is 
regarded as partial under this General Provision. This means that Indonesia is still 
required to propose for adoption further archipelagic sea lanes including all normal 
routes and navigational channels; it has to inform the IMO of its plans for the future 
designation and submission of additional sea lanes, and foreign states are entitled to 
exercise the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage through all routes used for 
international navigation.177 However, the GPASL is considered as against the provision 
of Article 53(4) as the article provides only a designation covering all normal routes 
used for international navigation.178 
 Also, this brings the situation where the user states will continue to request 
additional routes for archipelagic sea lanes passage and would take away the prerogative 
given to the archipelagic state of determining the necessary archipelagic sea lanes for 
management of maritime traffic.179 Further, the consideration by IMO of Indonesia’s 
submission reflects that the regime is focused on the preservation of interests of user 
states and further diminishes the control of archipelagic states. 180 If this is the case, this 
situation is not favourable to the archipelagic state because its position may no longer be 
equal to that of the user states. Article 53 may not be implemented by other archipelagic 
states and they may choose to apply restrictive policies to govern the use of its waters. In 
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the case of Indonesia, it chose to designate archipelagic sea lanes passage and 
considered it as a step closer to implementing its rights over its waters.181   
 
 
 
4.4 Factors Affecting the Archipelagic Sea Lanes   
 
It bears stressing that in designating archipelagic sea lanes passage, it would be 
important for an archipelagic state to take into great consideration its legitimate security 
interests as well as economic and environmental matters.182 Indonesia has taken note of 
these factors, particularly the matter of security. The interpretation of the user states on 
Indonesian archipelagic waters and the archipelagic sea lanes passage as international 
waters is a security issue because it involves claim of jurisdiction over Indonesian 
waters. Conflict may arise if both states assert their respective rights over these waters. 
Recall the incident in July 2003 involving US F18 Hornet jets detected flying Indonesian 
airspace without prior clearance while escorting the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson that 
alarmed the government.183 Although there were no incidents of similar nature that have 
been recorded since that time, it does not follow that it will not be repeated in the near 
future.  
 Other major factors that affect archipelagic sea lanes passage and the larger part 
of Indonesian waters are the maritime crimes of piracy and armed robbery. It may be 
noted that ASL I passes through the Natuna Sea before dividing towards the Singapore 
Strait and South China Sea. In 2009, International Maritime Bureau (IMB)184 identified 
Natuna Islands, Anambas and Mangkai islands as the three piracy-prone areas in 
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Indonesian waters. 185  The IMB also issued warnings to mariners to take necessary 
precautionary measures while passing through these waters (see Annex 4). The pirates 
are armed with guns, knives or machetes and many attacks have gone unreported. 
Similarly, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)186 made a special report on piracy incidents in 
Natuna, Anambas and Magkai Islands where a total of eleven incidents of piracy attacks 
on vessels underway transpired in the area between January to June 2010. The analysis 
of ReCAAP in these incidents is that those reported in 2008 and 2010 were more 
scattered and occurred in a larger area than those in 2009.187 These two reports signify 
that piracy and armed robbery, as the case may be, are taking place in the area where 
ASL I lies and divides to Singapore Strait and South China Sea. The pirates operate in 
these areas considering that the waters are less monitored because of the distance.   
 More attention must also be given to terrorism at sea as a problem that is likely 
to grow in the future. Although there have been no major incidents of terrorist attacks on 
board the vessel in the areas where three archipelagic sea lanes traverse, in case a 
terrorist attack were to occur, it would have an immense impact not only on the security 
of the state but also on the global economic and political situation. The trade would 
definitely be disrupted because these areas may be closed for shipping or fishing in case 
of a single terrorist attack. Taking into account the total value of trade passing through 
archipelagic sea lane, 300USD trillion annually that would be lost.188 In the event that 
Sunda Strait and the Lombok-Makasar Strait (ASL II) would be blocked, the only detour 
available is to go around the south of Australia, hence transporting crude oil from 
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Middle East to Japan would add two weeks to the voyage and additional eighty (80) or 
so tankers would be needed to fulfil crude oil requirements.189  Terrorism at sea in this 
regard cannot be discounted because the vessels are regarded as vulnerable targets and 
sea lanes are being used by international vessels whether commercial or military. 
Terrorists could gain the international attention that they always seek in staging an attack 
or series of attacks.  
 The significance of Indonesian sea lanes cannot be discounted. They definitely 
provide the shortest routes from the Indian Ocean to the rest of the world. While there 
are still important practical issues to be resolved relative to Indonesian sovereignty and 
the reasonable rights of international shipping to pass through Indonesian waters, 
Indonesia chose to designate archipelagic sea lanes passage and considered it as a step 
closer to implementing its rights over its waters.190   
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CHAPTER V 
THE PHILIPPINES OUTSTANDING CONCERNS 
 
  
 
Similar to Indonesia, the Philippines, as one of the principal sponsors of the 
archipelagic principle brought this concept to the international community for the sake 
of unity of land, water and people and territorial integrity. The Philippine archipelago 
consists of 7,107 islands which are linked by waters. It has a total coastline length of 
36,289 kilometres and total land to water ratio of 1:1.2. The land area is approximately 
300,000 square kilometres and total water area of 2.2 million square kilometres.191 It lies 
between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The waters around the archipelago are 
important to international navigation because commercial ships passing through the 
Malacca Strait bound for Guam and Hawaii, must pass through Philippine archipelagic 
waters.192  These geographic characteristics suggest the need for the country to protect 
the security of its waters from unlawful use, external threats and to preserve marine 
resources and the environment.193  
Prior to UNCLOS 1982, the Philippines had already embraced the archipelagic 
doctrine and incorporated it in its national legislations in 1961 through the Republic Act 
(RA) 3046 as amended by RA 5446 of 1968 as well as in the1935 Constitution and the 
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1973 Constitution. Further, it adopted the principle in Article I of the 1987 Constitution 
which specifically defines Philippine territory as:  
   
   “The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, 
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other 
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or 
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial 
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the 
insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, 
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, 
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the 
internal waters of the Philippines.”194 
 
From the time the Philippines issued note verbale in 1955, its state practice has 
always been put in question as to whether the government complies with international 
law because its laws on maritime zones are not consistent with it. When the Philippine 
government signed the UNCLOS 1982, it issued a written declaration that “the 
provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or 
impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic state over the sea lanes and 
do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence 
and security.” 195 It further stated that “the concept of archipelagic waters is similar to 
the concept of internal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes 
straits connecting these waters within the economic zone or high sea from the rights of 
foreign vessels to transit passage for international navigation.” This very declaration has 
earned adverse reactions from maritime powers charging that the Philippines was 
making an unauthorized reservation or evading the obligations of the Convention. In 
response, the Philippines issued another declaration in 1988 assuring the State Parties to 
the UNCLOS 1982 that it would abide by the provisions of the Convention.196  
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However, it may be understood that the conflicting regimes in domestic laws 
were enacted prior to its ratification of the Convention. 197  The Philippines is 
continuously revisiting and harmonizing its laws with UNCLOS. Recent development in 
this regard was the enactment in March 2009 of RA 9522 otherwise known as an Act to 
Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 
5446, to define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes. It 
adopted the straight baselines system consistent with Article 47 of UNCLOS. This 
particular legislation was deposited with the UN Secretary General on 21 April 2009, in 
compliance with Article 47 (9).  
 
5.1 Perspective as an Archipelagic State 
 
From the country’s standpoint, there is no doubt that the Philippines is 
determined to fulfil its duties and obligations under the Convention. However, it is how 
these obligations and duties may be best carried out while at the same time protecting its 
own interests. 198  It may be noted that based on its 1987 Constitution there is no 
distinction between archipelagic waters and internal waters while in the Convention 
these two maritime zones are specifically delineated. The archipelagic waters are 
constantly equated as internal waters because of the inseparable unity of land and water 
domain.199 The waters adjoining land territory are regarded as the extension of the land. 
Further, the waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago had 
always been highways of communication between the islands which brought the people 
together under one sovereign state.200 They are directly within sight of a large part of the 
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population; hence, the government is expected to exercise full control over all the 
activities in the archipelagic waters, particularly those undertaken by foreign vessels.201 
For this reason, the management of these waters should be closer to the internal 
waters regime than to territorial sea regime and the state’s protection of this maritime 
zone from foreign intrusion is equated with the preservation of national integrity.202 Be 
that as it may, although the archipelagic waters are regarded as internal waters, the 
Philippines continue to respect and recognize traditional navigational right of innocent 
passage of foreign vessels over Philippine waters in consonance with the UNCLOS.  
 
 
5.2  The Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Proposal 
 
While designation of archipelagic sea lanes passage is the consequence of 
acquiring archipelagic status, the Philippines has yet to submit a proposal to IMO on the 
designation of archipelagic sea lanes passage. This also raised the issue of whether the 
Philippines would fulfil its statements made in 1988 that it would harmonize its 
domestic legislation with the provision of the Convention and that necessary steps were 
being undertaken to enact legislation dealing with the establishment of archipelagic sea 
lanes passage.203 Though there was a declaration, the Philippines is of the view that the 
matter of designating sea lanes should be studied carefully.204 This is of such vital 
concern because it critically puts into test the freedom of navigation, sovereignty over 
the archipelagic waters granted by UNCLOS 1982 to the archipelagic states and the 
Philippine legislations in this regard.  
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In line with this, two archipelagic sea lanes were proposed to be designated in the 
country; the East-West sea lane and the North-South sea lane.205 The East-West will 
traverse from Balabac Strait to Sulu Sea Junction going through Bohol Sea between 
Northern Mindanao and Southern Negros Islands and the Bohol Islands then through 
Surigao Strait going through Pacific Ocean. The North-South route is from Celebes Sea 
going through Sibuto Passage between Sibuto Island and Simunol Island, Bongao 
passing through the Sulu Sea to Mindoro Strait into the South China Sea.  
The straits of Balabac, Surigao between Leyte and Mindanao are normal routes 
used for international navigation while the straits of Mindoro, Balabac and Sibuto 
passage have to be settled because of full sovereignty exercised by the country over 
these waters.206 Nonetheless, the proposed sea lanes adequately cover the usual passage 
routes because the East-West route will serve the ships coming from the Malacca Strait 
going to Guam, Hawaii and other destinations in the Pacific while the North-South will 
serve the ships coming from the west coast of Australia and Lombok Strait going to 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Northern China, Korea and Japan.207  
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Figure 3 Philippine Proposed Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage 
(The ASLP are represented in heavy lines) 
 
Source: Ocean and Law Policy Series, Vol 1 No. 1 1997 at p11 
 
 
The proposed sea lanes follow the requirements of UNCLOS specifically that 
they should not deviate more than 25 nautical miles to both sides of the axis line, 
provided that ships and aircraft do not navigate more than 10% of the distance closer to 
the coast between the nearest points on islands bordering the sea lanes.208 This means 
that the 25 nautical miles is an allowance for navigational purposes to avoid collisions of 
ships and aircraft but it does not prevent the archipelagic states from prescribing shorter 
distance depending on the situation.209 In this regard, the Philippines may limit the 
physical extent of the archipelagic waters where the sea lanes may be designated for 
safety purposes. Further, the difference provides a greater degree of flexibility in 
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protecting the coast of the islands adjacent to archipelagic sea lanes from intrusion.210 It 
may also be noted from the figure above that the sea lanes would traverse in the waters 
adjacent to the islands where there are existing fishing grounds. Hence, though 
deliberation on the matter is being undertaken.  
  
 
5.3 Issues Covering the Philippines Proposed ASLP 
 
Based on Article 53 of the UNCLOS, archipelagic sea lanes passage should be 
designated through archipelagic waters, covering all normal routes used for international 
navigation and shall traverse to the adjacent territorial sea. Though the Philippine 
proposal may have covered all routes normally used for international navigation, it is not 
yet submitted to IMO for approval. A number of factors should be taken into account in 
the event that the Philippines chose to designate archipelagic sea lanes.211 These include 
the effectiveness of the government to monitor the sea lanes, security of the country, 
measures to ensure safe, expeditious and continuous passage, fisheries and marine 
environment, inter-island shipping and the possible connection with the Indonesian 
established ASLP.  
 
  5.3.1 Legal Issues 
 
It may be recalled that the archipelagic waters referred to under the Convention 
are considered as internal waters under the 1987 Constitution. These are the waters 
landward of the baselines (though in Philippine legislation they are described as waters 
around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago). Under the internal water 
regime, the state enjoys absolute sovereignty and no right of innocent passage exists.212 
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This is the very essence of internal waters under the Philippine Constitution. Entry of 
foreign vessels may be prohibited and they may be apprehended for intrusion. This is 
where the problem would arise in designating archipelagic sea lanes passage.  
There is constitutional issue in designating archipelagic sea lanes passage 
because the waters within the Philippine archipelago are national or internal waters.213 In 
case the archipelagic sea lanes passage is established, it follows that the status of internal 
waters may be diluted or may be given two characteristics, that is, internal waters with a 
strip of archipelagic waters or absolute sovereignty over internal waters can be 
exercised but diluted with rights given to foreign vessels to pass the internal waters 
through archipelagic sea lanes without permission of the Philippine government.214 It 
may be understood that the nature of the internal waters will be diminished because 
foreign vessels could pass through in normal mode even without prior notice to the 
government, thereby creating more legal issues.  
 Relatedly, taking into account that the Philippines (to include Cape Verde, 
Dominican Republic and Maldives) has designated archipelagic baselines in a manner 
not consistent with Article 47, no right of archipelagic sea lanes passage would exist 
because the presence of archipelagic waters is a condition precedent to this passage.215  
Considering the foregoing legal issues, it may be argued that the conflicting 
regime in domestic law may delay full implementation of Part IV of UNCLOS by the 
government. 
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5.3.2 Environmental Issues 
 
 Other than legal issues, the marine environment is also taken into account. The 
government is of the view that by reason of closely knit geographical features, 
navigational corridors of 50 nautical miles wide for archipelagic sea lanes passage 
cannot be accommodated and in case sea lanes are designated, foreign vessels may still 
deviate by passing through non-designated routes invoking their right to innocent 
passage.216  The proposed routes present threats to two of the most delicate marine 
biodiversity areas in the country and the world: the Tubbataha Reef, a World Heritage 
Site; and the Verde Island Passage Marine Corridor which is known as a world hot spot 
for marine biodiversity as well as center of shorefish biodiversity.217   
Hence, in lieu of establishing archipelagic sea lanes passage, the whole country 
will be designated as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) 218  and associated 
protective measures (APMs) will be instituted in order that security, good order and 
peace may be better served.219 The APMs will be instituted to guide vessel transit in 
exercise of the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. Specific measures, like routeing 
of ships can be used to control the maritime activities in the PSSA. Simply put, 
designation of archipelagic sea lanes passage may not be applicable to the Philippines 
because of its unique marine environmental features and geographical set up.  
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5.3.3 Major Maritime Security Issues 
 
Apart from legal and environmental issues surrounding the designation of 
archipelagic sea lanes passage, maritime security remains to be the primary factor with 
respect to passage of vessels through archipelagic waters.220 Maritime security in the 
Philippines is a key component of national security and it is specifically defined under 
its National Marine Policy of 08 November 1994, as “a state wherein the country’s 
marine assets, maritime practices, territorial integrity and coastal peace and order are 
protected, conserved and enhanced.”221 It involves national security aspects and security 
issues with regional impact.222 The former includes protection of the integrity of the 
Philippine territory whereas the latter comprises illegal activities that fall within the 
purview of transnational crimes and may affect neighbouring states.223  Protection of 
territorial integrity is of paramount importance to Philippine defence policy which 
involves addressing land based insurgencies which is a long standing security concern of 
the government and maintaining physical presence to safeguard the territories in the 
Philippine-occupied islands in the Spratly.224  
 In protecting its territory, the passage of military vessels in the Philippine waters 
without prior clearance from the government poses maritime security concerns. The 
government has never changed its policy of requiring prior notice of passage of warships 
for purposes of proper management of the very extensive vessel traffic that takes place 
daily and to avoid sources of friction.225 However, different notions of third states on the 
status of Philippine waters may undermine the prior notice requirement of the 
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government. The United States included the Philippines and Indonesia in its Freedom of 
Navigation Program 2000-2003 Operational Assertion as countries in which it can 
regularly assert its freedom of navigation.226 Under this Program it conducted dozens of 
routines passage through the waters of these two archipelagos. In 2000, it conducted 28 
transits in the Philippine archipelago. It regarded the Philippines to have excessive 
straight baselines. In June 2009 it was reported that a Chinese submarine collided with 
underwater sonar array towed by destroyer USS John McCain at approximately 144 
miles from Subic, potentially placing it in Mindoro Strait, Philippines.227. This indicates 
that they have different interpretations on the status of the waters of the Philippines. 
From the point of view of the Philippines, the baselines drawn are not excessive and are 
consistent with UNCLOS.    
 On the other hand, the waters in southern Philippines have always been a 
maritime security hot spot even before 9/11 because it is the home of Islamic separatist 
groups.  The location where the proposed two archipelagic sea lanes passage will be 
established traverses the Sulu Sea in southern Philippines, an area of major concern to 
the government. The Sulu Sea is one of the theatres of operation of the terrorist groups 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Moro International Liberation Front (MILF). There is a 
still high risk of a terrorist attack in the Philippines because of the presence in the 
country of these major terrorist groups that definitely have the capabilities to launch an 
attack at sea. 228 The ASG which was founded in the early 1990s has proven its intent 
and capability to wage maritime terrorism in the bombing of Christian missionary ship 
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MV Doulos in August 1991; kidnapping of twenty-one people, ten of whom were 
foreign tourists, in Sipadan, Malaysia in April 2000; abduction of three Americans and 
seventeen Filipinos in Dos Palmas Resort, Palawan in May 2001 and the bombing of 
Superferry 14 in February 2004 after it left Manila Bay.229  
Other than ASG, the MILF which was founded in 1978 with the aim to establish 
a separate Islamic state in southern Philippines through jihad has also extreme 
familiarity within the maritime domain. The group always denies its involvement in 
terrorist attacks in the south particularly that of Our Lady of Mediatrix in February 2000 
at the bay off Mindanao which killed forty people. Despite MILF’s continuous denial of 
their involvement in maritime terrorism, it has to be taken seriously because of its links 
to regional terrorist organizations, such as the Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah 
Islamiah (JI), which has been making plans for maritime terrorist attacks in Southeast 
Asia.230  
While the gruesome terrorist attacks mentioned did not transpire in the proposed 
ASLP area, the ASG proved its maritime terrorist mettle and demonstrated its 
capabilities of operating outside its usual maritime turf.231  The members of ASG and 
MILF live very close to the waters of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi where they have 
gained tremendous familiarity with the maritime environment. 232  Presently, these 
terrorist groups are operating in landbases. However, seas in southern Philippines are 
more vulnerable to terrorist attack because of difficulties to guard these waters. The 
proposed routes for archipelagic sea lanes passage are of no exception.  
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It bears stressing that the discretion to designate archipelagic sea lanes remains 
on the archipelagic state. Although it is not mandatory, non-designation may be 
disadvantageous to the Philippines because the right of passage through these sea lanes 
may be exercised through routes used for international navigation and the state cannot 
monitor and regulate the passage of foreign vessels.233 The advantage to the Philippines 
if it designates sea lanes is that the routes over which vessels can exercise archipelagic 
sea lanes passage will become clear and monitoring of traffic therein for possible vessel-
source pollution will be better implemented.  
In the light of the preceding discussions, the Philippines recognizes the 
significance of archipelagic sea lanes passage. Once the sea lanes are designated, 
uncontrolled navigation over its waters will be prevented. Vessels shall respect the 
designated sea lanes and corresponding traffic separation scheme based on Article 
53(11).  However, it is carefully balancing the interest between the third states with its 
own interest as the possessor of jurisdictional rights over its waters. It may revisit its 
position with regard to designation of archipelagic sea lanes passage following the 
newly enacted Baseline Law, RA 9522, but the paramount importance of security of its 
waters will be considered.  
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CHAPTER VI  
  
MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES  
 
 
 
The Philippines and Indonesia may have different perspectives with regard to the 
establishment of archipelagic sea lanes passage. Indonesia preferred to designate these 
sea lanes to fully acquire archipelagic status while the Philippines chose to withhold the 
designation to assess carefully the needs of the user states and the concerns of the 
country. However, both states have common interests in protecting the archipelagic sea 
lanes from unlawful interference because such sea lanes traverse the archipelagic waters 
and the adjacent territorial sea. This implies direct access to the archipelagic domain 
right around the perimeter.234 Any incident that may happen on the archipelagic sea 
lanes passage will have direct effect on the archipelagic state concerned because it is 
within its maritime jurisdiction. The nature of archipelagic sea lanes passage is exposed 
to maritime security challenges be it maritime crimes or foreign intrusion.  
Maritime security can be defined as those “measures employed by owners, 
operators and administrators of vessels, port facilities and offshore installations and 
other marine organizations or establishments to protect against seizure, sabotage, piracy, 
pilferage, annoyance or surprise”.235 The definition enumerates the crimes that may be 
committed against vessels while underway or anchored. Also, it denotes the state of 
being free from such threats.236 Maritime targets may be considered less attractive than 
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land and air targets because the terrorist should possess a high degree of skills and 
capabilities in executing the attack. However, seas are apparently more vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks because of embedded difficulty to guard the waters.237 The Philippines 
and Indonesia contribute 24 and 59 percent, respectively; to the total 92,451 km 
coastline of Southeast Asian region.238 This situation raises the concern of these two 
world’s largest archipelagos over their respective maritime zones and sea lanes used for 
international navigation even higher. The figure below illustrates the important routes 
for international navigation between Indonesia and the Philippines.  
 
Figure 4  Southeast Asia Transit Region 
 
(The red lines represent Major Ocean Navigation Routes) 
 
 Source: Navigational Restrictions within the New LOS Context, Geographical Implications 
for the United States 1986 at p 290 
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6.1 Facing Maritime Threats  
 
 
The attack against US Navy Destroyer, USS Cole in the port of Aden in 2000 and 
that of French oil tanker Limburg in the coast of Yemen in 2002 have made the terrorist 
statements clear that they can penetrate the force protection and they can affect world 
commerce.239 The Limburg attack raised concerns over the possibility that terrorists in 
the Southeast Asian region might attempt a maritime terrorist attack in the Straits of 
Malacca.240 The latter is the shortest route between Middle East and the ever growing 
Asian market with an estimated 15 million bbl/d flow in 2006. 241  In recent years, 
international interest in maritime security has been focused on Malacca and Singapore 
Straits but shipping in the Indonesian archipelago, particularly through Lombok and 
Makassar Straits is potentially vulnerable to attacks.242 These straits constitute ASL II 
and similar to other established archipelagic sea lanes passage in Indonesia, they serve 
as primary shipping lanes for Australian international commercial navigation.  In 2004–
05, freight carried via the ASL constituted 39 per cent of Australia’s exports by value 
(50 per cent by weight) and 32 per cent of imports by value (41 per cent by weight). 243 
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Table 1 
Estimate of ship movements passing through world’s shipping lanes relating 
to Australia’s trade,  2004–05 
 
Source: Working Paper 69, Bureau of Trade and Maritime Economics, Australian Maritime Trade 2000-01 2004-05 at p. 13  
http://www.btre.gov.au  
 
Table 2 
 Estimate of Australia’s trade passing through world’s shipping lanes 2004-05 
Source: Working Paper 69, Bureau of Trade and Maritime Economics, Australian Maritime Trade 2000-01 2004-05 at p. 14 
http://www.btre.gov.au  
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It may be noted from the tables above that a significant number of vessels 
relating to Australian international trade pass through the established archipelagic sea 
lanes. Although the data reflect only the utilization by Australia of the sea lanes, these 
shipping routes are important to the world’s sea borne trade between the Indian Ocean 
and the Pacific Ocean. These particular sea lanes have not been included in scenarios 
where possible terrorist attacks could take place. However, their susceptibility to 
maritime threats cannot be ignored.  
 
 
6.1.1  Maritime Terrorism  
 
One of the threats is maritime terrorism. Any disruption caused by the blocking 
of passage due to this maritime security threat would result in great economic loss for 
the user states. Taking Australia as an example, its reliance on Indonesian ASLs 
constitutes a significant percentage of its seaborne trade. Any unplanned disruption of 
sea lines of communications between Australia and the rest of the world could devastate 
the country’s national economy.244 This also impacts upon the archipelagic state because 
the passage traverses within its maritime zones.   
The main terrorist organization operating not only in Indonesia but also in the 
larger part of Southeast Asia that has capability of launching attacks be it in the sea or on 
land is Jemaah Islamiya (JI). It is labelled as Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia that promotes 
the idea of establishing an Islamic Caliphate in the region around Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, southern Philippines and southern Thailand.245 JI is known for its hideous 
terrorism activities particularly the Bali attack on October 2002 that claimed 
approximately 200 lives. The seaborne capabilities of its key operatives and its notorious 
history of planning suicide missions to attack American naval warships passing through 
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Malacca Strait in 2001 as well as vessels visiting Changi Naval Base in Singapore make 
JI as a real threat to maritime security.246  
On the other hand, maritime terrorism also affects the waters of the Sulu Sea 
where the proposed north-south and east-west routes of archipelagic sea lanes will 
traverse. This is undertaken by extremists groups ASG and MILF. They have records of 
linkages with JI which started in Afghanistan in 1980s.247 MILF protects JI members by 
providing training facilities for over a decade and key JI fugitives from Indonesia and 
Malaysia join ASG.248   The members of ASG and JI joined together in July 2005 for 
underwater training in Sandakan, Malaysia in preparation for attacking maritime 
targets.249  They routinely move between Sabah, Borneo and their training camps in 
Mindanao by speedboat, local craft and ferries. 250 This alliance of terrorist groups shows 
their capabilities. They are well equipped, well trained and their styles of attacks vary 
which makes future terror activities even harder to predict. This is also an indication that 
these terrorist groups may have begun to look at the maritime domain as a new avenue 
for attacks. 
 
6.1.2 Piracy and Maritime Terrorism 
 Piracy is another great concern for these two states on their waters. Based on the 
reports of ReCAAP and IMB, as pointed out in Chapter IV, piracy and armed robbery 
exist in Natuna waters where Indonesian ASL I traverses. It is also worth mentioning 
that Indonesian waters continue to be included on the IMB list of piracy prone areas in 
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Southeast Asia. From 2005 to March 2010, IMB recorded a total of 57 piratical and 
armed robbery attacks in the waters of Indonesia compared to 7 attacks in the Malacca 
Strait in the same period (see Annex 5). The drop in number of piratical attacks in the 
Malacca Strait is attributed to the aggressive patrol of littoral states since 2005 but it 
remains to be in the IMB list of piracy prone area according to ICC-IMB Report First 
Quarter 2010.  
While piracy is also reported in ports and anchorages and regarded as largely a 
criminal issue, it has become a serious security issue by reason of its potential 
connection with maritime terrorism.251 It is given that piracy is different from terrorism 
considering that the former is motivated by private ends while the latter is rooted in 
political or religious ideology. However, possible cooperation between terrorists and 
pirates poses a huge risk.252 The indications that piracy is used as a means of funding 
terrorism activities are conclusive in the case of Southern Philippines.253 Members of 
MILF and ASG use piracy mainly as a means of fund raising.254 These extremists have 
been accused of conducting piratical attacks in Sulu and Sulawesi as a means of 
generating income for their causes.255 The vast majority of maritime depredations in 
these areas have gone unreported to the IMB because it only receives reports in English 
via high frequency radio or fax, and language skills and equipment are often lacking. 256 
Also, the masters of the vessels prefer not to report the incidents even to local authorities 
for fear of another attack. Maritime violence in this area has so far been more serious in 
terms of human suffering.257  
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Seemingly, the international attention on maritime violence remains focused on 
the Straits of Malacca because of its importance as a major international sea lane with 
over 50,000 vessels258 transiting per year and an attack in this area would have a great 
consequence to the global economy259. However, if maritime terrorism and piracy are 
placing Malacca Straits or any other sea lines of communication in great danger, these 
maritime threats also place the archipelagic sea lanes in great danger which will 
prejudice global maritime trade and specifically the security of the archipelagic state.  
 
 
6.2  Securing Maritime Domain 
 
 The issue of passage of military vessels has been the heart of the archipelagic 
problem and is likely to remain a source of controversy.260 The primary military concern 
of third states is the maintenance of their navigational rights within archipelagic waters 
which makes the regime a highly politicized problem. 261  There are differing 
interpretations of user state and archipelagic state on various issues surrounding the right 
of archipelagic sea lanes passage of military vessels and aircrafts.  
 
  “normal mode” 
 
The term “normal mode” in Article 53 (3) provides an undetermined range of 
activities for warships navigating archipelagic waters which are not permitted in the case 
of innocent passage in territorial seas.262 The meaning of “normal mode” is not given in 
UNCLOS 1982.263 From the context and from the negotiating history, the term was 
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intended to refer to that mode which is normal or usual for navigation by a particular 
type of ship or aircraft making the passage; hence, the employment of radar, sonar and 
depth finding devises would be included if they are normally used in navigation.264 The 
term could also include submerged transit, maintenance of ship formation, continuous 
operation of naval surveillance and monitoring equipment, constant weapon readiness 
and aircraft launch and recovery. 265 
Under Article 39(c), warships navigating in normal mode shall refrain from any 
activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious 
transit except in cases of force majeure or by distress. This means that they are not 
permitted to engage in any other activities like conducting war game exercises, making 
covert transmission or hydrographic surveys. Otherwise, navigating in normal mode 
would be contrary to continuous and expeditious passage required by Article 53(3) 
which are the obligations that fall on the transiting ships or aircraft in archipelagic sea 
lanes passage.266 Also, this may bring the situation where the archipelagic sea lanes 
would be considered as a playground of foreign warships which is not favourable to 
archipelagic states. 
 
 “connecting parts of the high sea” 
 
Relatedly, the fact that archipelagic sea lanes passage may further proceed 
through territorial sea can be interpreted in a broad sense, as connecting parts of the high 
seas or exclusive economic zone.267 The user states construe sea lanes as extensions of 
the high seas or EEZ while the archipelagic states regard them only as a link between 
one part of the high seas or EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ. In 
                                                            
264 Ibid.  
265 Supra, footnote 179 at. p 97 
266 Supra, footnote 21 at p. 477 
267 Supra, footnote 13 at p. 27 
  75
asserting their respective rights, the former would always maintain freedom of 
navigation while the latter would claim sovereignty over the archipelagic waters 
pursuant to Article 49(4).  
In the reported incident mentioned in the preceding Chapter involving a US 
destroyer and Chinese submarine, the states concerned claimed that they were in 
international waters.  It may be noted that the location points to Mindoro Strait, one of 
the routes proposed as north-south archipelagic sea lanes. While Philippine government 
did not file a diplomatic protest with either the US or China and chose not to commence 
a political discussion on the issue, this has caused uproar among civil society. The 
incident was regarded as one of the many unnoticed intrusions in the Philippine 
archipelago because of its vast maritime space and extremely limited surveillance 
capability. A similar case took place in Indonesia as mentioned in Chapter IV which 
prompted the citizens to push the government to regularize a single east-west route 
through Java Sea.   
In the case that the warships mentioned or any other foreign warships are 
exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in that particular route, the 
UNCLOS 1982 requires that the act of passing should be continuous; vessels shall 
proceed without delay and shall not cause any threat to the security of the archipelagic 
state. In case of an aircraft, the right of overflight is restricted to air routes above sea 
lanes which preclude its application to overflight above land territory.268 It is important 
for foreign warships or aircraft to proceed without delay through these sea lanes to 
prevent any notion of performing other activities prejudicial to the security of the 
archipelagic state. Hence, archipelagic sea lanes passage means no-stopping passage 
where there should be no activities may be conducted. 
Both the Philippines and Indonesia prefer prior notice of passage of warships 
because the mere presence of military vessels within the archipelagic waters if there is 
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no military exercise raises a security issue. Indonesia requires prior notification for 
warships entering its territorial sea.269 This may not be convenient for the user states on 
the grounds that it hampers the continuous and expeditious passage. However, this 
requirement is designed to prevent any surprise to naval forces securing the waters, 
which may create other issues between third states and the archipelagic state. In practice, 
both states recognize the navigational right of third states over their archipelagic waters 
wherein even statements of excessive claims are oftentimes tolerated. They further allow 
foreign warships to pass through the routes normally used for international navigation. 
 
 “level of jurisdiction” 
 
Emphases should also be made on the level of jurisdiction that the archipelagic 
state may exercise over the vessel exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. 
It bears stressing that Article 42 applies mutadis mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes 
passage. It provides that the application of laws and regulations shall not have a practical 
effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of passage. In this regard, the level 
of jurisdiction is prescriptive only.270 This level of jurisdiction allows a coastal state to 
require ship’s compliance with safety rules, fishing, pollution control and customs 
laws.271 Ships may not be inspected, arrested, detained, refused passage or subjected to 
other forms of control that would impair the right of passage.272 In this regard, the 
archipelagic state could only exercise its enforcement jurisdiction to the full extent in 
case the ship would voluntarily enter the state’s ports or in some other way comes within 
the state’s competence to totally exercise its enforcement jurisdiction.273 Nonetheless, 
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these restrictions should not affect the right of the archipelagic state to board a particular 
vessel passing through the sea lanes based on reasonable suspicions that it is engaged in 
piracy or in unlawful acts or is a ship without flag.  
It is given that the right is non-suspendable under any circumstances and that 
passage of foreign warships in normal mode cannot be impeded. However, by reason of 
this limited jurisdiction, the archipelagic state may exercise other options for the sake of 
its self preservation in the event it is confronted with serious maritime security issues 
caused by vessels exercising the right. It may be recalled that there were times 
particularly in 1988 where Indonesia closed or attempted to close some of its straits and 
in 1992 it questioned the passage rights of an Australian submarine navigating through 
Sunda Strait.274 These situations indicate that the archipelagic state would implement 
necessary measures to ensure that its national interest is adequately protected.  
 
 
6.3 Advantages of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage  
  
As the seaborne trade flows into and within the Asia-Pacific region increase, the 
reliance on the sea as a mode of transport also increases.275 This development makes the 
security of sea lanes even more crucial as they are considered major arteries from which 
the wealth of regional economic progress will spread.276 It is important that navigation 
of commercial shipping in Southeast Asia should be free and safe despite of the 
challenges.  
One of the advantages of designating sea lanes is the proper monitoring of vessel 
traffic on routes normally used for international navigation. Once sea lanes are 
designated, foreign vessels, particularly warships, are confined to exercise the right of 
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passage through designated archipelagic sea lanes and can only exercise innocent 
passage through the remaining archipelagic waters.277 This will prevent warships from 
navigating within any part of the state’s maritime zones and further claim that they are 
exercising the right, thereby indiscriminately opening the whole archipelago to 
archipelagic sea lanes passage. It facilitates the transport of seaborne trade because 
foreign commercial vessels would traverse the shortest international route in a 
continuous and expeditious manner. For Indonesia, the designation enhanced the safety 
of navigation, protection of the environment and also the security of maritime domain.278 
With regard to designation of east-west passage, it requires thorough deliberation to 
ensure safety of passage and the marine environment and that the security of Indonesia 
would be safeguarded.279   
 On the other hand, the Philippines is aware that the sea lanes are the lifeline of 
the region and securing them provides unhampered access to markets and investment 
opportunities on economies within the region.280 Notwithstanding the restrictive nature 
of passage regime in archipelagic waters, it may be proper and advantageous for the 
country to use the designation as a means of maintaining a relationship with the 
international community particularly the user states traversing its waters.281  
In case the Philippines decides to push through with the designation of 
archipelagic sea lanes following the enactment of the new baseline law, the country may 
consider designating a minimum number and only the major routes used for 
international navigation should be covered for purposes of archipelagic sea lanes 
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passage.282 In any case that these normal routes accommodate the interests of the major 
user states, the Philippines may choose to enter into bilateral agreements with, e.g., the 
US for its naval interest and Australia for its commercial interest.283 Considering the 
importance of protecting environmentally sensitive areas, it would also be in the interest 
of the country to limit the passage by certain types of vessels with special types of cargo 
through certain sea lanes.284  The government may also prescribe the areas to be avoided 
or provide a traffic separation scheme in case the route would traverse a declared 
PSSA285 as long as it would not impede the passage. This would ensure the safety of 
navigation through the designated sea lanes as well as protect the marine environment 
and its maritime security.  
The designation of archipelagic sea lanes carries with it the obligation to keep 
them safe. Both states should focus on capability building measures whether at the 
national level or regional level to ensure the safety of navigation. Cooperation between 
the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines for the possible connection of ASL II 
and the projected north-south route should be studied in order to safeguard the passage. 
Continuous coordination is necessary to overcome the challenges of maritime security 
along the sea lanes as well as the entire maritime domain.   
                                                            
282 Supra, footnote 123 at p. 129 
283 Ibid.  
284 Supra, footnote 18 at p. 170 
285 Raul Pedroso, Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage in Myron Nordquist, Tommy T.B. Koh and John 
Norton Moore (Editors) Freedom of Seas, Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008 at p. 459 
  80
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
It is worth noting that maritime security challenges related to archipelagic sea 
lanes passage being faced by the Philippines and Indonesia encompass general concerns 
for the security of the maritime domain and crimes that may be committed through the 
use of the sea. Differing interpretations on the status of passage create security issues. 
Maritime crimes such as piracy, maritime terrorism and armed robbery against ships in 
the maritime domain are among the factors that have a potentially great impact to sea 
lanes be they archipelagic sea lanes or routes or straits used for international navigation. 
Notwithstanding, both states are conscious of the interests of maritime powers with 
regard to strategic and economic dependence on the passage through the archipelagos. 
Both continue to protect the needs of the user states by implementing measures to keep 
the shipping lanes free from obstruction.  
In this regard, the claims of the archipelagic states, the Philippines and Indonesia, 
for special regimes and for recognition as single entities cannot be construed as mere 
claims to extend maritime jurisdiction. 286  They are not plain eager assertions of 
sovereign control over the waters connecting the islands of the archipelago. It is 
extremely important for these states to preserve territorial integrity which serve as a 
stepping stone to economic development. The specialized regime of archipelagic sea 
lanes passage was negotiated in the hope that this scheme would achieve a balance 
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between the rights of navigation of third states and the archipelagic states’ respective 
national interests.  
In exercising the option given by UNCLOS 1982 under Article 53, the 
archipelagic states may evaluate the advantages and disadvantages this designation 
might bring in the exercise of sovereignty over their maritime zones. In the case of 
Indonesia, as the first state to designate archipelagic sea lanes, it considers the move as a 
step closer to implementing its rights over its waters although the designation was held 
by the IMO as “partial designation”. The issue of “partial designation” creates 
controversy to the user states but as far as Indonesia is concerned, it has carried out its 
responsibility to the international community.  The Philippines, on the other hand, 
determined that this matter should be carefully weighed in light of new developments in 
maritime security before it could finally implement Article 53. Be that as it may, it is 
important that the legislations to be adopted in this regard be consistent with UNCLOS 
and that the state practice should uphold overall interests.  
The regime brings both advantages and disadvantages. It facilitates transport of 
seaborne trade and movement of military vessels while the state that designated the same 
is able to properly monitor vessel traffic on routes normally used for international 
navigation. On the other hand, the disadvantages to the archipelagic state are the non-
suspendable feature of the right and the limited jurisdiction that may be exercised upon 
the vessel. It is true that freedom of navigation remains a residual fundamental freedom 
which can be limited only when the need to do so is demonstrated. 287  However, 
measures by archipelagic states such as coastal monitoring/surveillance or boarding of 
suspect vessels might be justified in cases where the activities of foreign vessels affect 
the security of the archipelagic sea lanes or the maritime domain in general. Foreign 
warships and commercial vessels might consider these measures as obstructions to 
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continuous navigation. Nevertheless, preventive measures should not be interpreted as 
encroachments on passage rights but should be viewed as initiatives advantageous to 
both user states and archipelagic states.  
The principle introduced by Grotius does not mean freedom to navigate in 
accordance with the domestic laws of the flag state alone but should be understood as 
navigation, trade and commerce within the framework of international law. Hence, the 
responsibility must be shared between the user states and the archipelagic state. 
Balancing of interests, which is the very purpose of introducing this specialized regime, 
involves careful consideration of the concerns of both sides and continuous 
reconciliation of the interests involved.   
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